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Cities today collect and store a wide range of data that may contain sensitive information about 
residents. As cities embrace open data initiatives, more of this information is released to the 
public. While opening data has many important benefits, sharing data comes with inherent risks 
to individual privacy: released data can reveal information about individuals that would otherwise 
not be public knowledge. 
At the heart of this dilemma lie two traits of granular (i.e., multi-dimensional, raw, and record-level) 
open data:
•   Benefit (utility): Because it enables varied and detailed analyses, granular data is the most 
interesting and useful for businesses, policymakers, researchers, and the public.
•   Risk (privacy): Because it contains the most detailed information, granular data often includes 
personally sensitive information.
These two attributes are often in conflict because less granular data protects privacy but is less 
valuable as an asset to promote transparency, enable innovation, and aid research. Just as open data 
is not valuable unless it is detailed, opening data will not be effective if it necessarily involves risks 
to individual privacy. It is therefore critical to develop effective approaches to balance these benefits 
and risks, enabling cities to release open data without unduly compromising sensitive information.
Traditional privacy and anonymization frameworks focus on identifying and removing personally 
identifiable information (PII).1 Recent research, however, has revealed that this framework is 
unsustainable and ineffective. Because so much data is now available from a wide variety of sources, 
and because databases can be manipulated and combined in complex and unpredictable ways, 
information that might not be deemed PII can lead to the identification of a specific individual and 
enable inferences to be made about that individual. 
In 2014, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) wrote, “By data 
mining and other kinds of analytics, non-obvious and sometimes private information can be 
derived from data that, at the time of their collection, seemed to raise no, or only manageable, 
privacy issues” and that “one can never know what information may later be extracted from any 
particular collection of big data.”2 A 2015 study of anonymity in metadata concludes, “Our results 
render the concept of PII, on which the applicability of U.S. and European Union (EU) privacy laws 
depend, inadequate.”3
1 Paul M Schwartz and Daniel J Solove, “Reconciling Personal Information in the United States and European Union,” California Law Review 
102, no. 4 (2014).
2 President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology. “Big Data and Privacy: A Technological Perspective.”  (2014) https://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_big_data_and_privacy_-_may_2014.pdf.
3 Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye et al., “Unique in the shopping mall: On the reidentifiability of credit card metadata,” Science 347, 
no. 6221 (2015).
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Unfortunately, there are few clearly defined sets of data attributes that do or do not reveal private 
information. Computer scientists Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov write, 
4 Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov, “Myths and fallacies of “Personally identiable information”,” Communications of the ACM 53, 
no. 6 (2010).
5 President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, “Big Data and Privacy: A Technological Perspective.”
6 Jill R. Aitoro, “Defining privacy protection by acknowledging what it’s not,” Federal Times, March 8, 2016 http://www.federaltimes.com/
story/government/interview/one-one/2016/03/08/defining-privacy-protection-acknowledging-what-s-not/81464556/.
“The versatility and power of re-identification algorithms imply that terms such as ‘personally 
identifiable’ and ‘quasi-identifier’ simply have no technical meaning. While some attributes 
may be uniquely identifying on their own, any attribute can be identifying in combination 
with others.”4
Neither regulations nor ordinances provide sufficient clarity, as data publishers and consumers are 
moving faster than lawmakers. As PCAST writes, existing laws based on outdated PII concepts may 
give a false sense of security: “[A]nonymization is already rooted in the law, sometimes giving a 
false expectation of privacy where data lacking certain identifiers are deemed not to be personally 
identifiable information and therefore not covered by such laws as the Family Educational Rights 
and Privacy Act (FERPA).”5 Thus, while ensuring legal compliance is a natural starting point for 
crafting data release policies, cities must look beyond legal compliance when crafting data release 
procedures and strategies. 
This leaves open data officials in the position of often serving as de facto privacy arbiters. Because 
there is no clear consensus regarding how to add privacy protections prior to releasing datasets, 
municipal officials use varying processes to manage how data is collected, maintained, and 
released. While cities are eager to release data, they also want to avoid privacy mishaps that could 
emerge immediately or in the future and undermine an otherwise beneficial program. 
Without the ability to manage and mitigate privacy risks in an effective and auditable manner, open 
data programs will be unable to fully realize the benefits stemming from collecting, using, and 
sharing data. Effective privacy management is essential to maximizing the impact of open data. 
As Marc Groman, Senior Adviser for Privacy at the Office of Management and Budget describes, 
“a well-resourced, well-functioning privacy program […] will promote innovation […] and enable 
more information sharing.”6
The goal of this document is to take a first step toward codifying responsible privacy-protective 
approaches and processes that could be adopted by cities and other groups that are publicly 
releasing data. Our report is organized around four recommendations.
1. Conduct risk-benefit analyses to inform the design and implementation of open data programs.
The complexity of balancing utility and privacy in open data means that there is no “correct” 
decision for any dataset: releasing data carries benefits for the public as well as potential risks to 
individual privacy. Cities have both legal and ethical obligations to protect the individuals whose 
sensitive information they possess. That risks in this area are inevitable, however, does not mean 
that cities should stop releasing data; cities will need to become comfortable with a certain level of 
risk. As cities move to release open data, they must become informed about the risks involved as 
well as the privacy and security controls available to mitigate these risks. Cities should then conduct 
risk-benefit analyses to evaluate whether the value that open datasets could yield outweighs the 
potential privacy risks of releasing that data.
2. Consider privacy at each stage of the data lifecycle.
Cities have traditionally focused on privacy only when releasing open data, but effective privacy 
management requires privacy to be taken into account at all stages of a dataset’s lifecycle. Privacy 
risks can emerge and be realized throughout the open data lifecycle of collection, maintenance, 
release, and deletion. Certain risks are best addressed at each stage. Cities should make privacy-
aware decisions before they collect data, before they store or process data, and before and after 
they release data. Implementing appropriate safeguards at all stages is particularly important for 
municipal governments because public records requests can prompt the release of data at any 
time. Cities should therefore carefully consider what data they should collect and store, and not 
just what data they will release. 
3.  Develop operational structures and processes that codify privacy management widely 
throughout the City.
Because there is no one-size-fits-all solution to data privacy, cities should develop clear and 
consistent data management processes to continually evaluate the risks and benefits of releasing 
data. To this end, open data management should shift from output assessment (“have we released 
enough data?”) to process-oriented standards (“have we evaluated and acted upon the risks and 
benefits related to collecting, managing, and sharing this dataset?”). Privacy efforts should draw 
on the field of information security, which focuses on risk-mitigation processes. These policies 
should be specifically designed to reflect the priorities that the city intends to support, and to meet 
the city’s needs to comply with open records and privacy laws. Cities should be able to document 
the steps they have followed. Critical to these aims is institutionalizing privacy awareness through 
programs such as employee trainings that ensure privacy policies and priorities are understood 
widely. Similarly, a toolkit of data-sharing strategies that go beyond the binary open/closed 
distinction will help cities maximize the value their data provides. In order to ensure ongoing 
compliance within the rapidly-evolving data privacy ecosystem, cities should periodically review 
their practices and risk-benefit assessments.
RECOMMENDATIONS
4.  Emphasize public engagement and public priorities as essential aspects of data 
management programs.
A primary motivation for launching open data initiatives is that open data holds tremendous promise 
to improve government transparency and accountability. Yet open data is merely a means toward 
transparency and accountability, not an end in itself. Cities can further the goal of accountability 
by being transparent about their open data decisions: rather than focusing on publishing the most 
data, open data leaders should also evaluate their efforts based on the extent to which data are 
released in a transparent and accountable manner. When publishing new open data, for example, 
cities should share their rationale for making the data available, expected benefits of releasing 
that data weighed against the privacy risks, and measures that have been implemented to protect 
privacy. Ultimately, a successful open data program relies on public trust that the government is a 
responsible steward of individual data. Decisions regarding how to release data should therefore 
be made with meaningful consideration for the public’s priorities regarding what information is 
released. Cities should also carry out proactive and ongoing engagement to incorporate public 
input into their open data decisions and to keep the public informed about new developments.
Each chapter of this report is dedicated to one of these four recommendations, and 
provides fundamental context along with specific suggestions to carry out these high-level 
recommendations.
Chapter 1 introduces the concepts and practices behind risk-benefit analyses, along with 
background on the privacy risks of open data and the limits of existing de-identification 
approaches. 
Chapter 2  outlines a lifecycle approach to managing privacy in open data, describing a variety 
of steps that cities can take to better protect individual privacy. 
Chapter 3 emphasizes the importance of internal practices, focusing on the need to 
institutionalize effective privacy management at every stage of the data lifecycle and at all levels 
of the organization.
Chapter 4 describes the role of public engagement, emphasizing the need for a nuanced 
understanding of public concerns and proactive engagement regarding open data decisions. 
Each chapter includes the following components:
Summary: an overview of the key background and motivation for the recommendation.
Background: the context necessary to understand the motivation for the recommendation and 
its implementation.
Take action: a set of practices that can be implemented in accordance with the recommendation.
In practice: a case study highlighting why the recommendation is necessary or how an 
organization is implementing best practices.
Finally, the Appendix synthesizes key elements of the report into an Open Data Privacy Toolkit 
that cities can use to manage privacy when releasing data.
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Opening access to municipal data involves a series of tradeoffs. Releasing data can increase 
transparency in government, allow citizens to engage with their cities, and empower entrepreneurs 
to build innovative tools and applications. As cities around the United States embrace open data 
practices, more of these benefits become possible every day. But because much of this data 
contains information related to individual citizens, releasing it also presents the potential for 
private information to be revealed. Limiting privacy risks when releasing data remains an unsolved 
challenge for open data initiatives.
It is difficult to balance the utility gained from allowing public consumption of data with the 
risks to individual privacy that occur when releasing that data. The broad tradeoff is clear: raw, 
granular data about people is the most useful but also the most sensitive; data with fewer fields or 
less-informative features better protects privacy but limits utility (Figure 1). And broad sections of 
the public may be benefited by releases of data that might be felt by a few people to invade their 
personal privacy. This puts open data programs in a difficult situation. Unfortunately, there are no 
clear boundaries to define when data is “useful” or “sensitive” — these two traits coexist and are 
often in conflict. That risks in this area are inevitable, however, does not mean that cities should 
stop releasing data; cities will need to become comfortable with a certain level of risk.
Sharing data in any form involves a tradeoff between providing value and 
exposing private information (or information that could later be triangulated 
to reveal personal information). Risk-benefit analyses help cities find data 
management solutions that maximize benefits and minimize risks.
PRIVACY
UTILITY
RAW DATA
NO DATA
9
 CONDUCT RISK-BENEFIT  
ANALYSES TO INFORM  
THE DESIGN OF OPEN  
DATA PROGRAMS.
1. 
Figure 1. The tradeoff between privacy and utility
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One example of information at the nexus of this multi-dimensional dilemma is crime data about 
sexual assault and domestic violence. Crime data is simultaneously one of the most useful and 
desired municipal datasets and, especially in the case of sexual assault data, one of the most 
sensitive. While open data about sexual assault and domestic violence can be a powerful 
tool for research and advocacy, the potential re-identification of victims can have significant 
consequences. A survey by the National Domestic Violence Hotline found that 60% of women 
who had experienced partner abuse and not contacted the police attributed their reticence to 
“not wanting police involvement due to a desire for privacy.”7 Moreover, reports estimate that “an 
estimated 211,200 rapes and sexual assaults went unreported to police each year between 2006 
and 2010.”8 This represents 65% of such incidents. For a crime that already exists in the shadows, 
careless disclosure of victim identities could have chilling effects to an already under-reported 
crime. Given that re-identification of victims of domestic violence and sexual assault “could put 
their safety and security at risk”, FTC Chief Technologist Lorrie Cranor writes, “it is critical that we 
think through data re-identification issues before releasing data to the public.”9
To navigate this complexity, cities can conduct risk-benefit analyses, a flexible framework for 
weighing the advantages and disadvantages of any practice or process. For open data, such 
analyses can illuminate the specific features of datasets that contribute to their risks (release of 
sensitive information) and benefits (utility from releasing data).
On the federal level, numerous policies emphasize the need for privacy impact assessments of 
data before it is released. For example, the Open Data Policy of 2013 mandates agencies to take 
a risk-based approach to data privacy, writing, “The definition of PII is not anchored to any single 
category of information or technology. Rather, it requires a case-by-case assessment of the specific 
risk that an individual can be identified.”10
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) provides a useful framework for 
conducting risk assessments.11 NIST’s process measures risk by identifying five components: 
vulnerabilities, threat events, threat sources, impact, and likelihood. These elements together 
define the level of risk; Figure 2 on the following page displays how these components interact 
with one another to produce negative outcomes.
7 The National Domestic Violence Hotline. “Who Will Help Me? Domestic Violence Survivors Speak Out About Law Enforcement Responses.” 
(2015) http://www.thehotline.org/resources/law-enforcement-responses/.
8 Lynn Langton et al. “Victimizations Not Reported To The Police, 2006-2010.” Bureau of Justice Statistics  (2012) http://www.bjs.gov/index.
cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4962.
9 Lorrie Cranor, “Open Police Data Re-identification Risks,”  https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/techftc/2016/04/open-police-data-re-
identification-risks.
10 Sylvia M Burwell et al., “Open Data Policy—Managing Information as an Asset,” Executive Office of the President, Office of Management 
and Budget 2013. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2013/m-13-13.pdf.
11 National Institute of Standards and Technology. “Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments.”  (2012) http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/
Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-30r1.pdf.
RISK BENEFIT
Data Attribute (vulnerability, asset) Vulnerabilities are attributes that increase 
an organization’s susceptibility to negative 
outcomes (threat events).
Assets are attributes that increase an 
organization’s ability to capture positive 
outcomes (advantage events).
Event (threat event, advantage event) Threat events are negative outcomes that 
arise out of vulnerabilities.
Advantage events are positive outcomes 
that arise out of assets.
Source (threat source, advantage source) Threats sources are people or organiza-
tions who seek to initiate threat events.
Advantage sources are people or orga-
nizations who seek to initiate advantage 
events.
Likelihood Likelihood is the chance that a threat 
event occurs through a threat source suc-
cessfully exploiting a vulnerability.
Likelihood is the chance that an advan-
tage event occurs through an advantage 
source successfully exploiting an asset.
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Figure 2. Risk assessment overview
In order to incorporate benefit into our open data risk-benefit framework, we have adapted these 
components for risk into an equivalent process to assess benefits. The table below provides 
definitions for the terms comprising risk and benefit.
From National Institute of Standards and Technology. “Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments.”  (2012) http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/
Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-30r1.pdf.
RISK BENEFIT
Impact Impact is the negative effect caused by 
a threat event. This is a factor of both 
scale (the number of people affected) 
and severity (the damage caused to each 
person).
Impact is the positive effect caused by an 
advantage event. This is a factor of both 
scale (the number of people affected) 
and severity (the utility provided to each 
person).
Outcome (risk, benefit) Risk is a synthesis of the likelihood and 
impact that describes the overall danger 
for an organization. 
Benefit is a synthesis of the likelihood and 
impact that describes the overall opportu-
nity for an organization. 
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Cities can combine these components to evaluate the benefits and risks of open data through an 
approach focused on data attributes. In a data-oriented approach, a city would assess risks by first 
identifying vulnerabilities in its data. For each of these vulnerabilities, the city would then list the 
threat events that may exploit these vulnerabilities and the threat sources that may initiate these 
threat events. Then a city would assign each threat event a likelihood of occurring and an impact 
if it were to occur. Finally, based on its determination of the likelihood and impact, the city can 
synthesize these components to determine overall risk. The same process, using the equivalent 
terms for benefits, would apply to evaluate the benefits of data. 
The results of the risk and benefit assessments comprise a risk-benefit ratio, which compares the 
overall risks and benefits present in a dataset. A high risk-benefit ratio means that the risks are high 
relative to the benefits, while a low risk-benefit ratio means that the benefits outweigh the risks. 
The risk-benefit ratio can guide decisions regarding whether and how to release or withhold data. 
If the risk-benefit ratio implies that there are more risks than benefits to releasing data, cities should 
attempt to improve this ratio through mitigations (interventions that decrease risk). A mitigation 
should explicitly target the vulnerabilities that lead to risks while attempting to maintain the assets 
that lead to benefits. A successful mitigation should lead to a more palatable risk-benefit ratio 
(typically by decreasing risk more than it decreases benefit). 
To illuminate how the risk-benefit framework enables responsible data management, this chapter 
explains how to conduct a risk-benefit analysis for municipal open data.
Open data programs outline high-level objectives such as increasing transparency, improving 
internal efficiency, stimulating economic growth, and improving quality of life for residents. 
Nevertheless, these same initiatives often treat all datasets equally and evaluate progress based 
on the number of datasets released. In reality, each dataset contributes a different amount to 
these goals.
Making an educated decision about how best to release open data requires a clear assessment of 
each dataset’s value. This can be done by considering the potential uses and users of that data. 
Without such an assessment, it is impossible to weigh the privacy risks of a dataset (described in 
Section 1.2) against the potential value that the data creates.
Measuring the value of open data requires understanding how citizens use data. For datasets that 
have already been published, this can be done by analyzing the volume of usage and the value of 
those uses. To further learn how residents are using (or might use) data, cities can analyze public 
records requests, web traffic statistics, and online feedback forms. Perhaps more importantly, cities 
can also directly engage residents — including those who know little about open data — to learn 
more about how open data can provide value for the community.
When releasing new datasets, a broad understanding of open data uses is critical for predicting 
how that data might be used or even for tailoring the data to facilitate particular uses. Applications 
of open data from the past several years include:
•   Social justice advocacy12
•   Transit apps13
•   Tools to explore a city’s budget14
•   Notifications to residents about events in their city15
Assessing the best way to release a dataset requires clear objectives for that 
data once released. Identifying useful data, potential users, and desired out-
comes is essential for evaluating the potential positive impacts of open data. 
13
DETERMINE THE DESIRED BENEFITS  
OF RELEASING EACH ELEMENT OF 
OPEN DATA.
1.1
12 Becca James, “Stop and frisk in 4 cities: The importance of open police data,”  https://sunlightfoundation.com/2015/03/02/stop-and-
frisk-in-4-cities-the-importance-of-open-police-data-2/.
13 City and County of San Francisco, “Transportation << San Francisco Data,”  http://apps.sfgov.org/showcase/apps-categories/
transportation/.
14 City of Philadelphia, “Open Budget,”  http://www.phila.gov/openbudget/.
15 “Citygram,”  https://www.citygram.org.
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•   Academic research about civic engagement16
•   Visualizations of demographics in the US17
A 2016 study18 of New York City’s open data portal19 surveyed 77 applications that utilized the City’s 
data. Among these applications, the four most popular topics were 311 requests, crime, public 
transit, and the environment. To understand the benefits of open data, cities should also consider 
who is using open data; in addition to evaluating the uses and topics of the applications, this 
study also profiled the developers of these applications. The results, shown in Figure 3, indicate 
that most applications are built by “Individuals with technical and/or quantitative backgrounds” 
(such as civic hackers), but that government departments, tech companies, and nonprofits are also 
important developers.
The diversity of these applications and users suggests that there are many avenues for open 
data to provide value. To provide the most useful open data possible, and to properly weigh 
these benefits against potential privacy risks in the data, cities should assess and document every 
dataset before its release to determine how the data might be used, who will use it, and who will 
benefit from those uses.
61%
13%
9%
8%
6% 3%
Individuals with technical and/or 
quantitative backgrounds
Government departments
Tech companies
Non-profit civic organizations
Unknown developers
Individuals with unknown 
backgrounds
Figure 3. Background of developers using NYC open data
17 Dustin Cable, “The Racial Dot Map: One Dot Per Person for the Entire United States,”  http://demographics.coopercenter.org/DotMap/
index.html.
18 Karen Okamoto, “What is being done with open government data? An exploratory analysis of public uses of New York City open data,” 
Webology 13, no. 1 (2016).
19 The City of New York, “NYC Open Data,”  https://nycopendata.socrata.com
Based on data from Karen Okamoto, “What is being done with open government data? An exploratory analysis of public uses of New 
York City open data,” Webology 13, no. 1 (2016).
TAKE ACTION 
The following form guides cities through benefit assessments. As shown, benefit is calculated at the asset level rather than the dataset level; 
this allows for tailored assessments that consider individual features that contribute to benefit and risk, and can be mitigated.
The following two sections (1.2 and 1.3) provide forms for risk and mitigation assessments. See the Appendix for a full risk-benefit analysis 
form that combines benefit, risk, and mitigation assessments.
DATA FEATURES 
(ASSETS)
What are the rows,  
columns, entries, or sets of 
entries that may contribute  
to the overall benefit?
ADVANTAGE EVENTS
In what forms is the data  
feature beneficial? How will  
it be used?
ADVANTAGE SOURCES
Who might use the  
data feature? 
BENEFIT
What is the overall benefit  
of the data feature?
Example 1:
Pickup and dropoff  
locations for taxi trips
 Individual records
 Aggregated data
Potential uses:
•  Understand traffic patterns
•  Study working conditions of 
taxi drivers 
 Civic hackers 
 Community groups
 Individuals
 Journalists
 Researchers
 Other
Example 2:
Sexual assault locations  
for 911 data
 Individual records
 Aggregate data
Potential uses:
•  Understand crime patterns
•  Look up details of  
specific cases
 Civic hackers 
 Community groups
 Individuals
 Journalists
 Researchers
 Other
 Individual records
 Aggregate data
Potential uses:
 Civic hackers 
 Community groups
 Individuals
 Journalists
 Researchers
 Other
IMPACT
What is the 
potential benefit 
of the asset 
(balancing scale 
and utility)?
LIKELIHOOD
What is the probability 
that the impact will be realized?
L
M
L
L
L
M
M
L
M
H
M
H
HH
H
IMPACT
What is the 
potential benefit 
of the asset 
(balancing scale 
and utility)?
LIKELIHOOD
What is the probability 
that the impact will be realized?
L
M
L
L
L
M
M
L
M
H
M
H
HH
H
IMPACT
What is the 
potential benefit 
of the asset 
(balancing scale 
and utility)?
LIKELIHOOD
What is the probability 
that the impact will be realized?
L
M
L
L
L
M
M
L
M
H
M
H
HH
H
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One challenge for open data programs is prioritizing data for release: cities maintain many datasets 
that could be of public interest and value, and often struggle to determine the relative potential 
impact of these datasets. Given the work involved in releasing each dataset, it is important for 
cities to prioritize data effectively.
Mark Headd, the former Chief Data Officer for the City of Philadelphia, provides guidance for 
cities, writing, “governments should concentrate on The 3 B’s: Buses (transit data), Bullets (crime 
data) and Bucks (budget & expenditure data).”20 Similarly, citing a desire to “focus on what 
matters,” Abhi Nemani, the former Chief Data Officer for the City of Los Angeles, adds four more 
categories to his list of the most essential data to release: bills, 211 (services), 311 (issues), and 
411 (questions).21 The strategy endorsed by Headd and Namani emphasizes an explicit focus on 
releasing data that will most likely lead to benefits.
Another challenge for open data programs is facilitating benefits of open data by helping the 
public realize the data’s potential uses. A recent study of open data and civic engagement in 
Cambridge, MA found that a “Crowdsourced Problem Inventory” was far and away the most 
heavily desired open data engagement tool; the report suggests that Cambridge should “create 
a ‘problem inventory’ that allows city staff and residents to scope out city needs, and share ideas 
and solutions.”22 Such a strategy implies that open data portals should contain a repository of 
problems and questions that go along with each dataset. When a department shares data, it should 
also share relevant questions or analyses related to that data. Questions to analyze or requests 
(e.g., for a web application) based on the data could also come from community members. This 
approach would help the public translate data into valuable uses.
20 Mark Headd, “In Defense of Transit Apps,”  https://civic.io/2014/06/13/in-defense-of-transit-apps/.
21 Abhi Nemani, “Small (City) Pieces, Loosely Joined,”  https://medium.com/@abhinemani/small-city-pieces-loosely-joined-5202fb5a93e3.
22 Jennifer Angarita and The City of Cambridge. “Amplifying Civic Innovation: Community Engagement Strategies for Open Data 
Collaborations.”  (2016) https://docs.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https://data.cambridgema.gov/api/file_data/f879b5f3-aa03-
4e53-8600-7f5270299a62.
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The potential threat events from open data revealing private information are manifold. The following 
table describes several key consequences of sensitive information being released in open data. 
The privacy issues that can occur when open data is released may emerge 
due to a variety of data features. Cities should be mindful of vulnerabilities, 
threat sources, and threat events when evaluating the privacy risks involved 
in releasing open data. 
RECOGNIZE THE LIMITS OF  
DE-IDENTIFICATION TECHNIQUES  
AND EVALUATE THE PRIVACY RISKS  
OF RELEASING DATA.
1.2
23Latanya Sweeney. “Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely.”  (2000) 
24Erica Klarreich, “Privacy by the Numbers: A New Approach to Safeguarding Data,” Quanta Magazine  (2012).
25 J.K. Trotter, “Public NYC Taxicab Database Lets You See How Celebrities Tip,” Gawker, October 23, 2014. http://gawker.com/the-public-
nyc-taxicab-database-that-accidentally-track-1646724546.
THREAT EVENT DESCRIPTION RISK DESCRIPTION EXAMPLE
Re-identifica-
tion
Re-identification 
occurs when individual 
identities are inferred 
from data that has 
been de-identified 
(i.e., altered to remove 
individual identity from 
the data), and new 
information about those 
re-identified identities 
becomes known.
Re-identification involves the 
ability to learn information 
about individuals that would 
not otherwise be known. In 
many cases this new informa-
tion can lead to a variety of 
harms for the re-identified in-
dividuals such as embarrass-
ment, shame, identity theft, 
discrimination, and targeting 
for crime.
In 2000, Latanya Sweeney showed how de-iden-
tified health records could be combined with 
voting registration records to re-identify the 
health records of most individuals in the US.23 
This meant that it was possible to identify the 
individual referenced in many health records 
that were released under the assumption of 
anonymity. Scientific American describes a 
notable example: “William Weld, then the 
[Massachusetts] governor, assured the public 
that identifying individual patients in the records 
would be impossible. Within days, an envelope 
from a graduate student at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology arrived at Weld’s office. It 
contained the governor’s health records.”24
False  
re-identification
When data is partially 
anonymous, individuals 
are at risk of having 
sensitive facts incorrect-
ly connected to them 
through flawed re-iden-
tification techniques. 
This is especially likely 
to occur when open 
data is of low quality, 
and contains incorrect 
information or is difficult 
to interpret.
Failed re-identification can 
be as troubling as successful 
re-identification. Individ-
uals might have incorrect 
inferences made about them, 
which could lead to the 
same harms listed above for 
re-identification. These harms 
might be even more severe 
for false re-identification, 
since the outcomes will be 
based on false information or 
assumptions.
A release of data pertaining to 2013 taxi trips in 
New York City allowed journalists to determine 
where celebrities who had been photographed 
getting in or out of taxis were going to and 
coming from, along with the fare and tip paid. 
Surprisingly, many of these trips contained no 
recorded tip, leading to reports that certain ce-
lebrities were stingy and, in response, defenses 
from these celebrities’ agents.25 Further analysis 
of the data revealed that many trips simply have 
no recorded tip, suggesting that the assumption 
that some celebrities paid no tip was in fact 
incorrect and due to issues with data quality.
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THREAT EVENT DESCRIPTION RISK DESCRIPTION EXAMPLE
Profile-building Many companies and 
other groups compile 
information about 
individuals to build a 
digital profile of each 
person’s demographics, 
characteristics, habits, 
and preferences. Open 
data might contribute 
new information to 
these profiles.
Profiles built on data about 
individuals can be used to 
analyze and target informa-
tion to specific segments of 
the population, thus facilitat-
ing algorithmic discrimination 
and exclusionary marketing.
It has become common practice for compa-
nies to target ads to users based on individual 
preferences, and, in some cases, treat customers 
differently based on profiles developed by com-
piling data about those individuals. Bloomberg 
calls this practice “Weblining, an Information 
Age version of that nasty old practice of redlin-
ing, where lenders and other businesses mark 
whole neighborhoods off-limits. Cyberspace 
doesn’t have any real geography, but that’s no 
impediment to Weblining. At its most benign, 
the practice could limit your choices in products 
or services, or force you to pay top dollar. In a 
more pernicious guise, Weblining may perma-
nently close doors to you or your business.”26 
Open data can contribute new information that 
feeds online profiles and allows for potential 
discrimination.
Online  
discoverability
Information that is 
available online and ac-
cessible from an online 
search.
When information in open 
data appears in online search 
results, it appears to a wide 
audience who might not 
otherwise have sought out 
that information. This is a sig-
nificant change from the past, 
in which government records 
were typically available only 
to those who visited city hall 
to access them. Many citizens 
will be concerned when open 
data associated with their 
identity can be discovered 
through online searches for 
their name or address. Even 
if people are comfortable 
with the data being released 
on an open data portal, they 
might assume that the data is 
accessible only to those who 
seek it out. Exposing infor-
mation in open data to online 
search engines can violate 
this assumption.
Multiple websites today post arrest records, 
including mug shots, to the Internet.27 While 
this information is public record, traditionally 
one would have needed to go to a courthouse 
to obtain it. Now one can find this information, 
even inadvertently, just by searching the name 
of someone who is listed by mug shot websites. 
This is especially damaging, New York Times 
writes, because “Mug shots are merely artifacts 
of an arrest, not proof of a conviction, and many 
people whose images are now on display were 
never found guilty, or the charges against them 
were dropped. But these pictures can cause 
serious reputational damage.”28 The Times cites 
examples such as an individual who was denied 
a job due to online mug shots that appeared 
when a potential employer searched his name. 
These sites typically require fees up to several 
hundred dollars to have a mug shot removed, a 
practice that many have called extortion.
26 Marcia Stepanek, “Weblining: Companies are using your personal data to limit your choices—and force you to pay more for products,” 
Bloomberg April 3, 2000.
27 “Mugshots,”  http://mugshots.com/ 
28 David Segal, “Mugged by a Mug Shot Online,” The New York Times, October 5, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/business/
mugged-by-a-mug-shot-online.html.
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THREAT EVENT DESCRIPTION RISK DESCRIPTION EXAMPLE
Public backlash Whenever sensitive 
information is pub-
lished as open data, 
the public is likely to 
respond by blaming the 
government entity that 
released the data and 
losing faith in that entity 
to act as responsible 
data stewards.
Public disapproval of open 
data releases may result 
from one of the outcomes 
described above and suggest 
that the city is not acting 
with the best interests of its 
residents in mind. Further-
more, public disapproval 
detracts from the viability of 
an open data program. With-
out public trust in a city to 
responsibly share data, open 
data programs will struggle 
to gain necessary support for 
releasing data. More broadly, 
backlashes due to sensitive 
data releases undermine the 
public’s trust in government.
In June 2016, Washington, DC published online 
the City’s full voter list, which includes names, 
addresses, and political affiliations.29 Many 
people responded with shock and outrage that 
DC would publish this information in such a 
widely available format, tweeting with hashtags 
like “#open_data_fail”30 and calling the event 
“horrific.”31 While a public records law mandat-
ed that DC release this information, the event 
nonetheless made many individuals lose faith 
in DC as a responsible steward of their informa-
tion.32
29 Ethan Chiel, “Why the D.C. government just publicly posted every D.C. voter’s address online,” Fusion, June 14, 2016. http://fusion.net/
story/314062/washington-dc-board-of-elections-publishes-addresses/.
30 Ashkan Soltan,  https://twitter.com/ashk4n/status/742466746079010817.
31 Jake Laperruque,  https://twitter.com/JakeLaperruque/status/742464398619512832.
32 Chiel, “Why the D.C. government just publicly posted every D.C. voter’s address online.”
The negative outcomes described above can emerge through a variety of means: there are many 
ways that data can be mutated or combined to reveal sensitive information about individuals. 
Protecting privacy requires an understanding of how to identify and characterize sensitive 
information. The following table describes key vulnerabilities in municipal data that may allow 
individual privacy to be compromised.
VULNERABILITY DATA DESCRIPTION RISK DESCRIPTION EXAMPLE
Direct  
identifiers
Features within a dataset 
that, on their own, iden-
tify individuals. These 
features (such as name, 
address, and Social 
Security Number) have 
traditionally been known 
as personally identifiable 
information (PII).
Because direct identifiers implicate an 
individual, all of the data tied to that 
identifier can be connected to the 
individual in question.
One dataset commonly released 
by open data programs is property 
assessments. Because this information 
includes each property’s owner and ad-
dress (direct identifiers), most records 
can be connected to an individual. Any 
information attached to these records 
(such as property value, renovation his-
tory, and violations) can therefore also 
be traced back to an individual.
20
33Sweeney, “Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely.”
34 National Information Standards Organization. “Understanding Metadata.” (2004) http://www.niso.org/publications/press/
UnderstandingMetadata.pdf.
35President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, “Big Data and Privacy: A Technological Perspective.”
36 Anthony Tockar, “Riding with the Stars: Passenger Privacy in the NYC Taxicab Dataset,”  https://research.neustar.biz/2014/09/15/riding-
with-the-stars-passenger-privacy-in-the-nyc-taxicab-dataset/.
37Ibid. 
38de Montjoye et al., “Unique in the shopping mall: On the reidentifiability of credit card metadata.”
39Ibid.
40 Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye et al., “Predicting personality using novel mobile phone-based metrics,” in Proceedings of the 6th 
International Conference on Social Computing, Behavioral-Cultural Modeling and Prediction (Washington, DC: Springer, 2013).
VULNERABILITY DATA DESCRIPTION RISK DESCRIPTION EXAMPLE
Quasi  
(a.k.a. indirect) 
identifiers
Features within a dataset 
that, in combination 
with other data, identify 
individuals. The ability 
to link features across 
datasets and learn about 
individuals is known as 
the mosaic effect.
Seemingly innocuous data can be-
come revealing when combined with 
other datasets. Because quasi identi-
fiers provide some information about 
individuals (although not enough by 
themselves to identify someone), they 
often facilitate linkage attacks (using 
the mosaic effect) that combine auxilia-
ry information with quasi identifiers to 
identify individuals.
In a 2000 study, Latanya Sweeney 
showed how de-identified health re-
cords (containing the quasi identifiers 
birthdate, gender, and zip code about 
every individual) could be combined 
with voting registration records (which 
contain direct identifiers such as names 
along with the quasi identifiers men-
tioned above) to re-identify the health 
records of most individuals in the US.33
Metadata  
(e.g., behavior-
al records)
As The National 
Information Standards 
Organization describes, 
“Metadata is structured 
information that de-
scribes, explains, locates, 
or otherwise makes it 
easier to retrieve, use, or 
manage an information 
resource. Metadata is 
often called data about 
data or information 
about information.”34 In 
a database of emails, 
for example, metadata 
contains the sender, 
recipient, and timestamp 
of emails. While email 
metadata does not 
contain the contents of 
emails, it can reveal pat-
terns about how people 
correspond. As such, 
metadata often compris-
es behavioral records.
While metadata has not traditionally 
been seen as sensitive, the President’s 
Council of Advisors on Science and 
Technology (PCAST) writes, “There is 
no reason to believe that metadata 
raise fewer privacy concerns than the 
data they describe.”35 Although indi-
vidual metadata records may appear 
anonymous, large sets of metadata 
describe detailed and unique patterns 
of behavior that make it possible to 
identify individuals and learn intimate 
details about those people. Behav-
iors of individuals can be discovered 
based on auxiliary knowledge (such as 
paparazzi photographs36) or analyzing 
trends in the data (such as regular 
appearances at specific addresses37). 
Furthermore, the privacy risks related 
to metadata are particularly troubling 
because such data can reveal intimate 
details of a person’s life that would 
never otherwise be known and that 
the re-identified individual may never 
expect to be accessible.
Metadata is particularly sensitive when 
it is longitudinal, i.e., when multiple 
records of the same individual can 
be connected. In a 2015 study of 
de-identified credit card metadata, 
computer scientists showed that many 
people could be uniquely re-identified 
from records indicating the times and 
locations of each person’s purchas-
es.38 Because people’s movements 
and spending habits are idiosyncratic 
and unique, even a small number of 
records from one person are unlikely to 
be replicated by anyone else. In partic-
ular, the authors found that “knowing 
four random spatiotemporal points or 
tuples is enough to uniquely reidentify 
90% of the individuals and to uncover 
all of their records.”39 Another study 
found that it was possible to predict 
people’s personalities based on their 
mobile phone metadata.40
Addresses Street addresses or 
location names.
Location data is often highly identifi-
able and can reveal particularly sensi-
tive details about individuals. Because 
addresses identify where someone 
lives or where an event occurred, they 
are a rich source of information that 
make it easy to re-identify or learn 
intimate information about someone. 
Locations are also easy to link across 
datasets, facilitating the mosaic effect.
Many cities publish data about 311 
requests, which relate to topics such 
as street and sidewalk repairs, missed 
trash pickups, animal waste, and pest 
complaints. Because a typical entry in 
a 311 dataset includes the address for 
which the request is made along with a 
description of the issue, many requests 
can be re-identified to determine the 
requester and information about that 
person’s life.
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VULNERABILITY DATA DESCRIPTION RISK DESCRIPTION EXAMPLE
Geographic 
coordinates
Coordinates that identify 
a unique location on a 
map (i.e., latitude and 
longitude).
Geographic coordinates present the 
same vulnerabilities as addresses since 
they translate into locations. Because 
geographic coordinates do not by 
themselves reveal a location, however, 
they may appear to be less sensitive 
than the addresses they represent. 
This is misleading, as it is simple to 
obtain an address from geographic 
coordinates through a process known 
as “reverse geocoding.”
Crime data is one of the most heavily 
sought municipal datasets and, in 
the case of sexual assault-related 
incidents, one of the most sensitive. 
In order to protect the identities of 
victims when sharing open data, many 
jurisdictions remove the names and 
addresses associated with sexual 
assault incidents. However, such data 
occasionally includes the geographic 
coordinates of these incidents. Be-
cause it is relatively simple to obtain an 
address from geographic coordinates, 
this makes the victims of sexual assault 
highly identifiable. There are significant 
consequences if sexual assault victims 
are re-identified, including undue 
public scrutiny, violation of state shield 
laws, and potential chilling effects for 
future reports of sexual assault and 
domestic violence.
Unstructured 
fields
Fields that contain com-
ments, descriptions, or 
other forms of unstruc-
tured text (as opposed 
to structured fields, in 
which entries must take 
one of several predeter-
mined values). Photos 
can also be considered 
unstructured fields, 
as there are often few 
bounds on what informa-
tion they may contain.
Freeform text fields are often used in 
unpredictable ways, meaning that their 
publication may expose unexpected 
sensitive information.
In 2012, Philadelphia’s Department 
of Licenses & Inspections published 
gun permit appeals as part of its 
open data initiative. These permits 
included freeform text fields in which 
applicants explained why they needed 
the permit, and where some people 
wrote that they carry large sums of 
cash at night.41 As a consequence for 
publishing this information, the City 
was ultimately charged $1.4 million as 
part of a class-action lawsuit. One of 
the lawyers behind the suit stated that 
the information released “was a road 
map for criminals.”42
Sensitive  
subsets
Datasets can provide in-
formation about diverse 
populations or events. 
Each unique type of per-
son or event represents a 
subset of the data.
Certain categories of people (such 
as minors and sexual assault victims) 
within a dataset may be systematically 
more sensitive than the rest. Informa-
tion that might be suitable for release 
with the majority of data might be 
highly sensitive when it connects to 
these sensitive subsets.
In 2016, The Washington Post released 
a report describing how “the names of 
six people who complained of sexual 
assault were published online by Dallas 
police.”43 While the Dallas Police 
Department did not release “reports 
categorized as sexual assaults,” some 
cases involving complaints of sexual 
assault were classified into categories 
such as “Class C Assault offenses” 
and “Injured Person.” While it may be 
appropriate to release names in most 
cases in these general categories, the 
subsets related to sexual assault re-
quire special protections beyond what 
is needed for the majority of the data.
41Claudia Vargas, “City settles gun permit posting suit,” The Philadelphia Inquirer, July 23, 2014.
42Ibid.
43 Andrea Peterson, “Why the names of six people who complained of sexual assault were published online by Dallas police,” The 
Washington Post, April 29, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/04/29/why-the-names-of-six-people-who-
complained-of-sexual-assault-were-published-online-by-dallas-police/
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Figure 4. Linking quasi-identifiers to re-identify data
Figure 5. Financial metadata traces in a simply anonymized data set
Ethnicity
Visit date
Diagnosis
Procedure
Medication
Total charge
Medical Data Voter List
ZIP
Birth date
Sex
Name
Address
Date registered
Party affiliation
Date last voted
From Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye et al., “Unique in the shopping mall: On the reidentifiability of credit card metadata,” Science 347, no. 
6221 (2015). Reprinted with permission from AAAS.
Reproduced from Latanya Sweeney. “Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely.”  (2000).
TAKE ACTION 
Before releasing data, cities must determine their risk tolerance and then evaluate the privacy risks present in the data. The following form 
is designed as a guide to the risk assessment process. This form should be completed in tandem with the benefit assessment form, so that 
every key data feature is evaluated for both benefit and risk. This process will simplify risk-benefit comparisons and facilitate the mitigation 
assessment (Section 1.3).  
DATA FEATURES 
(VULNERABILITIES)
What are the rows,  
columns, entries, or sets of 
entries that may contribute  
to the overall risk?
THREAT EVENTS
In what ways is the data feature 
risky? How might it be abused?
THREAT SOURCES
Who might abuse the data 
feature?
RISK
What is the overall risk of the 
feature?
Example 1:
Pickup and dropoff  
locations for taxi trips
 Individual records
 Aggregated data
Potential uses:
•  Re-identification of drivers
•  Re-identification of passengers
•  Unfair leverage for ride-share 
companies
 Civic hackers 
 Community groups
 Individuals
 Journalists
 Researchers
 Other
Example 2:
Sexual assault locations  
for 911 data
 Individual records
 Aggregate data
Potential uses:
• Re-identification of victims
•  False re-identification  
of victims 
 Civic hackers 
 Community groups
 Individuals
 Journalists
 Researchers
 Other
 Individual records
 Aggregate data
Potential uses:
 Civic hackers 
 Community groups
 Individuals
 Journalists
 Researchers
 Other
IMPACT
What is the 
potential risk of 
the vulnerability 
(balancing scale 
and severity)?
LIKELIHOOD
What is the probability 
that the impact will be realized?
L
M
L
L
L
M
M
L
M
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M
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IMPACT
What is the 
potential risk of 
the vulnerability 
(balancing scale 
and severity)?
LIKELIHOOD
What is the probability 
that the impact will be realized?
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IMPACT
What is the 
potential risk of 
the vulnerability 
(balancing scale 
and severity)?
LIKELIHOOD
What is the probability 
that the impact will be realized?
L
M
L
L
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M
L
M
H
M
H
HH
H
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In August 2016, San Francisco released an Open Data Release Toolkit to guide thorough risk 
assessments of data being considered for publication.44 This document is a great resource for 
evaluating the privacy risks of open data and determining how to publish municipal information.
The Open Data Release Form, shown below, outlines the Toolkit’s process. Step 2 of the Release 
Form focuses on conducting a risk assessment of the data, and rests on assessing public 
expectations of privacy, the repercussions of re-identification, and likelihood of re-identification. 
The full Toolkit45 provides further instructions about how to fill out the Release Form, as well as 
contextual information about open data privacy risks and how to mitigate them.
44Erica Finkle and DataSF. “Open Data Release Toolkit.” (2016) https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B0jc1tmJAlTcR0RMV01PM2NyNDA/.
45Ibid.
 
Documenting the Decision-Making Process 
The following Open Data Release Form should be used to document your decision-making.  
Refer to the remainder of this Toolkit for step-by-step guidance to fill out this form. 
Open Data Release Form 
Basic Information 
Department  
Department contact  
Contact details  
Date  
Step 1: Identify sensitive or protected datasets 
1A. Dataset  
1B. Relevant fields  
 
 
 
 
Step 2: Identifiability Risk Assessment 
2A. Value of publication Value of publication 
❏ Low 
❏ Moderate 
❏ High 
2B-1. Risk of publication - 
impact  
 
(a) Individual Expectation of Privacy 
❏ Low 
❏ Moderate 
❏ High 
(b)  ​Repercussions 
❏ No discernable 
❏ Minor 
❏ Moderate 
❏ Major 
(c) ​ Impact = individual expectation of privacy X repercussions (legal,  
      financial, etc.)  
 
❏ Very low 
❏ Low 
❏ Moderate 
❏ Significant 
❏ High 
DataSF.org: Open Data Release Toolkit - ​Return to Top 5 of 31 
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2B-2. Risk of publication - 
risk rating  
(a) Impact: See 2b-1(c) above 
(b)  ​Likelihood of re-identification attempt 
❏ Rare 
❏ Unlikely 
❏ Possible 
❏ Probable 
(c)  ​Risk rating = impact X likelihood of re-identification attempt 
❏ Very low 
❏ Low 
❏ Moderate 
❏ Significant 
❏ High 
❏ Extreme 
2C. Weigh the value of 
publication against the 
risk of publication 
❏ Moderate – high value. Very low – low risk 
❏ Low – high value. Very low – moderate risk 
❏ Low – high value. Low – significant risk 
❏ Low – high value. Moderate – high risk 
❏ Low – high value. Significant – extreme risk 
❏ Low – moderate value. High – extreme risk 
Step 3: Privacy Solutions 
3A. Should the dataset be 
completely closed? 
Given the result of Step 2C, should the dataset be completely closed? 
❏ No 
❏ Yes 
If “yes”, do not proceed. 
3B. Identifiability 
spectrum level 
If the answer to Step 3A above is “no”, then choose an identifiability spectrum 
level based on the results in Step 2C: 
❏ Level 1: Readily identifiable data 
❏ Level 2: Masked data 
❏ Level 3: Obscured data 
❏ Level 4: Aggregate data 
3C. De-identification 
methods 
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Step 4: Accessibility Risk Assessment 
4A. Assess likelihood of 
successful 
re-identification 
❏ Rare 
❏ Unlikely 
❏ Possible 
❏ Probable 
4B. Is the de-identified 
dataset still useful? 
❏ None 
❏ Low 
❏ Medium 
❏ High 
4C. Accessibility risk 
rating 
❏ Very low 
❏ Low 
❏ Moderate 
❏ Significant 
❏ High 
❏ Extreme 
4D. Should the 
de-identified dataset be 
published? 
❏ Open 
❏ Limited Access 
❏ Closed 
Planning 
We plan to revisit the 
decisions in this form 
every... 
❏ 6 months  
❏ 1 year 
❏ Other __________________________ 
Next date for review  
 
Notes 
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Sensitive data often requires protection to make it appropriate as open data: when the risks of 
releasing data outweigh the benefits, cities may need to mitigate those risks before releasing data. 
Mitigations are controls that cities can use to protect sensitive information. Below is an overview of 
the most common techniques to consider when protecting individual privacy in open data. While 
no technique can remove all privacy risk involved in releasing data, the mitigations below outline 
important steps that cities can take to manage risks. In conjunction with the data-level approaches 
listed below, it is also possible to limit access to data through technical or contractual means such as 
access-control software or data-sharing agreements (see Section 3.4).
Cities should develop a toolkit of mitigations — approaches for altering data 
to alleviate privacy risks. For each dataset, cities should select the mitigation 
best suited for the specific risks and benefits present.
CONSIDER A DIVERSITY OF POTENTIAL 
MITIGATIONS AND CHOOSE THE ONE 
BEST CALIBRATED TO THE SPECIFIC 
RISKS AND BENEFITS OF THE DATA.
1.3
METHOD DESCRIPTION EXAMPLE PRIVACY IMPACT UTILITY IMPACT
Removing fields Deleting fields that 
contain sensitive 
information.
Removing the ad-
dresses from every 
record in a dataset of 
police incidents.
Removing fields 
effectively removes 
the risks presented by 
those fields
This approach nullifies 
any utility made 
possible by the fields 
being removed. So 
the negative impact 
on utility is large when 
removing fields that 
enable valuable uses, 
but small for less 
valuable fields.
Removing records Deleting records 
that are particular-
ly sensitive, either 
because of the type of 
event represented or 
because of rare (and 
hence more easily 
identifiable) features.
Removing records of 
sexual assault from 
a dataset of police 
incidents.
This is an effective 
way to protect the 
privacy of those 
represented in the 
removed records.
Because only a subset 
of records have been 
removed and the rest 
remain intact, the 
data remains viable 
for analysis. However, 
the removal of records 
could skew the results 
or give a false impres-
sion about the under-
lying data. And any 
analyses that rely on 
the removed records 
will be negatively 
impacted.
46 Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye et al., “Unique in the Crowd: The privacy bounds of human mobility,” Scientific Reports 3 (2013); de 
Montjoye et al., “Unique in the shopping mall: On the reidentifiability of credit card metadata.”
47 Latanya Sweeney, “k-anonymity: A model for protecting privacy,” International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based 
Systems 10, no. 5 (2002).
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METHOD DESCRIPTION EXAMPLE PRIVACY IMPACT UTILITY IMPACT
Aggregating data Summarizing data 
across the population 
and releasing a report 
of those statistics.
Reporting the num-
ber of crimes that 
occurred each month 
rather than releasing 
data about individual 
incidents.
Releasing aggregat-
ed data effectively 
protects privacy, as no 
raw data entries are 
released.
This has a severe neg-
ative impact on utility, 
as there is no raw data 
allowing for insights 
beyond the statistics 
presented.
Generalizing data Reducing the preci-
sion of fields in order 
to make each entry 
less unique.
Reporting addresses 
by hundred-block 
increments, block 
groups, or census 
tracts.
The less that data is 
generalized, the eas-
ier it is to re-identify 
someone. Lower lev-
els of generalization 
(e.g., block group) 
provide more oppor-
tunities for re-identi-
fication than higher 
levels (e.g., zip code). 
However, while gener-
alizing data can make 
re-identification more 
difficult, research has 
shown that coarsening 
data has only limited 
impact.46
The more that data 
is generalized and is 
characterized at less 
granular levels, the 
less useful it be-
comes. Lower levels 
of generalization (e.g., 
block group) provide 
more useful informa-
tion than higher levels 
(e.g., zip code).
k-anonymity47 Generalizing fields 
such that at least k in-
dividuals exhibit each 
feature within those 
fields. Different traits 
will require a different 
level of generaliza-
tion, depending on 
how many other en-
tries exhibit that trait.
For k=5, for example, 
generalizing dates of 
crime incidents such 
that every date shown 
contains at least five 
events that occurred. 
If 5 events occurred in 
a given hour, then the 
time of those events 
would be present-
ed as the hour they 
occurred; if 5 events 
occurred in a given 
day, those events 
would be attributed 
to the day with no 
information about the 
time of day.
As with generaliza-
tion, the improvement 
in privacy protection 
increases as the level 
of generalization (in 
this case, the value of 
k) increases. How-
ever, the efficacy of 
k-anonymity is limited 
in high-dimensional 
datasets (those that 
contain many fields) 
and in data that con-
tains outliers or rare 
cases.
As with generaliza-
tion, the negative 
impact on utility 
increases as the level 
of generalization (in 
this case, the value of 
k) increases
48 Dave Stinchcomb, “Procedures for Geomasking to Protect Patient Confidentiality,” in ESRI International Health GIS Conference 
(Washington, D.C.2004).
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METHOD DESCRIPTION EXAMPLE PRIVACY IMPACT UTILITY IMPACT
Adding noise  
(a.k.a. random  
perturbation)48
Adjusting data with 
randomness to offset 
its original informa-
tion.
Offsetting geographic 
coordinates of crime 
locations by a random 
distance and direction 
(generated from prob-
ability distributions).
The level of privacy 
protection increases 
as more noise is add-
ed to a dataset. The 
impact of noise de-
pends on the density 
of the population in 
question: less dense 
populations require 
more noise to protect 
privacy
As more noise is 
added to a dataset, 
the less useful it be-
comes, since the data 
presented becomes 
further removed from 
the events they rep-
resent. Furthermore, 
noisy data can be 
hard to communicate 
to the public and may 
be seen as misleading 
or an obfuscation of 
the truth. We recom-
mend against adding 
noise, and instead 
suggest generalizing 
data.
Creating anonymous 
identifiers
Replacing attributes 
with randomly gener-
ated codes that have 
no underlying connec-
tion to the attribute 
they replace. This is 
done through a cor-
respondence table, 
in which each unique 
attribute is paired with 
a random identifier 
that will replace that 
attribute wherever it 
appears.
In a dataset of taxi 
trips, replacing each 
unique license plate 
with its own unique 
ID number (e.g., 
a random number 
drawn from between 1 
and the total number 
of license plates). 
Every entry containing 
a given license plate 
would have the same 
ID number.
Anonymous IDs can 
help protect privacy, 
assuming that the 
anonymous IDs are 
randomly generated 
and have no system-
atic connection to 
the attributes they 
replace (which would 
occur for example if 
the numbers were as-
signed based on the 
alphanumerical order 
of license plates or a 
direct hash of license 
plates). Note that 
creating anonymous 
IDs does not protect 
against re-identifica-
tions or inferences 
based on analyzing 
patterns of behavior. 
Furthermore, having 
any common identi-
fier across all entries 
related to a specific 
individual means that 
once one entry has 
been re-identified, all 
entries for that person 
have also been 
re-identified.
This approach should 
have minimal impacts 
on utility, since it is 
still possible to track 
attributes across 
records.
49Alexandra Wood and Micah Altman, Personal communication, 2016.
50Cynthia Dwork, “A firm foundation for private data analysis,” Communications of the ACM 54, no. 1 (2011).
51Klarreich, “Privacy by the Numbers: A New Approach to Safeguarding Data.”
52U.S. Census Bureau Center for Economic Studies, “OnTheMap,”  http://onthemap.ces.census.gov. 
53 Andrew Eland, “Tackling Urban Mobility with Technology,” Google Europe Blog, November 18, 2015. https://europe.googleblog.
com/2015/11/tackling-urban-mobility-with-technology.html.
54U.S. Census Bureau Center for Economic Studies, “OnTheMap”.
55Privacy Tools for Sharing Research Data, “Private Data Sharing Interface,”  https://beta.dataverse.org/custom/DifferentialPrivacyPrototype/.
56University of Pennsylvania, “Putting Differential Privacy to Work,”  http://privacy.cis.upenn.edu/index.html.
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METHOD DESCRIPTION EXAMPLE PRIVACY IMPACT UTILITY IMPACT
Differential privacy49 Differential privacy 
is a formal mathe-
matical definition of 
privacy that provides a 
provable guarantee of 
privacy against a wide 
range of potential 
attacks.50, 51 It is not a 
single tool, but rather 
a standard of privacy 
that many tools have 
been devised to 
satisfy. Some differ-
entially private tools 
utilize an interactive 
query-based mecha-
nism, and others are 
non-interactive (i.e., 
enabling data to be 
released and used). 
Theoretical research 
on differential privacy 
is rapidly advancing, 
and the number of 
practical tools provid-
ing differential privacy 
is continually growing. 
For these reasons, 
differentially private 
tools are becoming an 
increasingly promising 
solution for cities to 
use in combination 
with other legal and 
technological tools 
for sharing data while 
protecting individual 
privacy.
Government agencies 
and corporations 
currently use differ-
entially private tools 
to provide strong 
privacy protection 
when sharing statis-
tics.52, 53 The Census 
Bureau, for example, 
currently makes some 
of its data available 
using non-interactive 
differentially privacy.54 
Additional tools for 
differentially private 
analysis are under de-
velopment at research 
institutions.55, 56
Differential privacy 
provides strong 
guarantees regarding 
the exact level of 
privacy risk available 
through a dataset. In 
contrast to tradition-
al de-identification 
techniques that are 
often designed to 
address a narrow class 
of attacks, systems 
that adhere to strong 
formal standards like 
differential privacy 
provide protection 
that is robust to a 
wide range of poten-
tial attacks — includ-
ing attacks that are 
unknown at the time 
of deployment — and 
do not require the 
person applying the 
technique to antici-
pate particular modes 
of attack.
Differential privacy 
minimally alters the 
underlying data, 
ensuring that the data 
retains almost all of 
its utility even after 
transformation. This 
feature distinguishes 
differentially private 
tools from traditional 
de-identification tech-
niques, which often 
require more blunt 
alterations. 
In addition to their 
robust privacy 
guarantee, differen-
tially private tools 
have the benefit of 
transparency, as it 
is not necessary to 
maintain secrecy 
around a differentially 
private computation 
or its parameters. 
Nonetheless, as with 
the approach above 
of adding noise, 
users of differentially 
private results may 
struggle to interpret 
the data.  Further-
more, providing data 
transformed in this 
way limits the ability 
to review specific 
records and might be 
seen as antithetical to 
open data.
TAKE ACTION 
If the results of the benefit and risk assessments imply that the data should not be released in its present state, cities must mitigate those 
privacy risks before releasing data. The following form is designed to guide cities through selecting and evaluating potential mitigations.
DATA FEATURES  
(ASSETS AND VULNERABILITIES)
What are the rows, columns, entries,  
or sets of entries that may contribute  
to benefit or risk?
RISK-BENEFIT RATIO
What is the overall risk-benefit ratio as 
determined by the benefit assessment 
(Section 1.1) and the risk assessment 
(Section 1.2)?
MITIGATIONS
What are the potential controls  
to mitigate risk?
RISK-BENEFIT RATIO  
AFTER MITIGATION
What is the outcome of the  
risk-benefit analysis after mitigation? 
FINAL OUTCOME
What is the final decision for  
how to release the data?
Example 1:
Pickup and dropoff  
locations for taxi trips
 Remove fields 
 Remove records
 Aggregate data
 Generalize data
 Anonymize IDs
 Other
Mitigation chosen:
Generalize locations to the  
block group
Release taxi data with pickup and 
dropoff locations generalized to the 
block group.
Example 2:
Sexual assault locations  
for 911 data
 Remove fields 
 Remove records
 Aggregate data
 Generalize data
 Anonymize IDs
 Other
Mitigation chosen:
Remove location fields
Release crime reports with the 
locations of sexual assault incidents 
removed.
 Remove fields 
 Remove records
 Aggregate data
 Generalize data
 Anonymize IDs
 Other
Mitigation chosen:
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IN PRACTICE
In 2014, in response to a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request, New York City released 
data detailing every taxi ride recorded in registered NYC taxis during 2013.57 The data contained 
information about pick up time and location, drop-off time and location, and the taxicab (in the 
form of license plate) and driver (in the form of medallion number) involved in each trip. In order 
to protect the identity of taxi drivers, NYC provided codes corresponding to the medallion and 
license numbers rather than the raw numbers.
When analyzing this information, data scientist Vijay Pandurangan realized that the codes for 
medallion and license plate represented hashes of the medallion and license numbers, generated 
using the hash function MD5 (an encryption function designed to turn identifying inputs into 
anonymized outputs in a manner that cannot be reverse engineered).58 Knowledge of how the 
codes were generated, combined with the standard form of license plates and medallion numbers, 
compromised this protection, however. Pandurangan writes:
57Chris Whong, “FOILing NYC’s Taxi Trip Data,”  http://chriswhong.com/open-data/foil_nyc_taxi/.
58Vijay Pandurangan, “On Taxis and Rainbows,”  https://tech.vijayp.ca/of-taxis-and-rainbows-f6bc289679a1 
59Ibid.
“A cryptographically secure hashing function, like MD5 is a one-way function: it always turns 
the same input to the same output, but given the output, it’s pretty hard to figure out what 
the input was as long as you don’t know anything about what the input might look like. This 
is mostly what you’d like out of an anonymization function. The problem, however, is that in 
this case we know a lot about what the inputs look like.”59
With this knowledge it was relatively simple for Pandurangan to re-identify the entire dataset in a 
matter of hours, thus revealing the identity, annual income, and home address of individual drivers. 
This story shows that it is not sufficient merely to identify a mitigation approach that protects 
privacy. Instead, care must be taken to ensure that the chosen mitigation technique is tailored to 
the privacy risks present in a particular dataset, and should be tested to ensure robustness against 
potential re-identification attacks. In this case, it would have been more effective to de-identify 
the license and medallion numbers by replacing each with a random number (i.e., anonymizing 
the IDs). Because these new numbers would be assigned to the license and medallion numbers at 
random, without any systematic connection to the structure or order of the original data, it would 
have been impossible to reverse engineer the true numbers from the random ones. Alternatively, 
NYC could have released the data without including license or medallion numbers at all.
Recognizing the limits of de-identification (as described in Section 1.2), cities should focus on 
mitigating privacy risks throughout the data’s entire lifetime rather than only when releasing data. 
Privacy should not be an isolated issue, considered only when data is about to be released. In 
this vein, Ira Rubinstein and Woodrow Hartzog argue that privacy laws should be “process-based, 
contextual, and tolerant of harm, so long as procedures to minimize risk are implemented ex 
ante.”60 Rather than focus only on outcomes, effective privacy protection requires a thorough 
process that minimizes risks before issues arise. 
Data, like any other type of infrastructure, requires effective management at all stages of its lifecycle. 
Given that open data involves releasing data, the preparation of data for public consumption has 
traditionally been the focus of privacy protection efforts related to open data. While this process 
is important (and is discussed in Section 2.3), effective privacy management matters at all stages 
of the data lifecycle. 
The lifecycle of open data can be summarized into the following stages:
 1. Collect data
 2. Maintain data
 3. Release data
 4. Delete data
These stages all have important implications for data privacy. This chapter descries the steps that 
should be taken within each stage to mitigate the privacy risks of open data.
Every stage of the data lifecycle involves actions and decisions that have 
consequences for individual privacy. Responsibly opening data to the public 
involves a process far more complex than just uploading data.
CONSIDER PRIVACY AT EACH 
STAGE OF THE DATA LIFECYCLE.
2. 
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60Ira S Rubinstein and Woodrow Hartzog, “Anonymization and Risk,” Washington Law Review 91 (2016).
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Privacy risks are first created when data is collected: individuals cannot be re-identified unless data 
about them has been collected and stored in the first place. Furthermore, the more data that is 
collected the greater the likelihood and consequences of re-identification. This is true not just for the 
number of features measured but also the number of records collected; for longitudinal data such as 
taxi trips, every additional trip tracked adds to the risks present in the data.
Once data has been collected, it is vulnerable to public release through multiple means, at which 
point it can be used for re-identification. This risk is made especially acute due to public records laws, 
which can compel the disclosure of data that might otherwise not be proactively released as open 
data. Cities should therefore assume that any data they collect could be made public and should 
thoughtfully ensure that the benefits of collection outweigh the risks before data is gathered. 
Finally, data collection by itself can be seen as a violation of individual privacy rights, even if the data is 
never made public. Many people are concerned about government surveillance – especially in recent 
years, due to the Edward Snowden revelations – and are therefore likely to be bothered by anything 
seen as excessive government data collection, particularly in the absence of any communication 
about the benefits of such collection (for more on public perceptions of data privacy, see Chapter 4).
Once data has been collected, it is susceptible to public release either as 
open data or through responses to public records requests. Limiting collec-
tion is often the best way to limit future disclosure.
COLLECT: BE MINDFUL OF PRIVACY 
BEFORE COLLECTING ANY DATA.
2.1
TAKE ACTION 
Many privacy risks arise due to excessive collection of features or records that are not essential for utilizing the data but provide information 
that can be used to identify an individual or one’s behavior. Cities should therefore follow the guidelines of data minimization: “the practice 
of limiting the collection of personal information to that which is directly relevant and necessary to accomplish a specified purpose.”61 This 
practice limits the privacy risks involved in collecting data and makes it more likely that benefits of collection outweigh the risks.
The following exercise can help cities map data collection to impacts – both positive and negative – in order to make informed collection 
choices. By answering these questions, cities can evaluate the risks and benefits of collecting each data element and determine their data 
collection strategy. 
To provide a sense of how this chart could enable informed data collection decisions, two rows have been filled out using potential features 
that could be collected as part of a public Wi-Fi program.
34
DATA FEATURE BENEFITS OF 
COLLECTION
What are the 
tangible benefits 
for which this 
data feature is 
crucial?
RE-IDENTIFICA-
TION RISK
What information 
could be learned 
about individuals 
using this infor-
mation?
PUBLIC RE-
SPONSE RISK
Would collecting 
this information 
violate public 
expectations 
about accept-
able government 
data collection? 
To what extent?
WOULD BE PUB-
LIC RECORD?
Would the 
data be public 
record? (Public 
records status 
compounds pri-
vacy risks, since 
it means that 
the data is more 
likely to be made 
public.)
COLLECT?
Domains visited 
(aggregated 
over all users)
Allows operators 
to monitor ser-
vice and under-
stand how users 
take advantage 
the service.
Low. It would be 
difficult to iden-
tify anyone if the 
domains visited 
are not linked 
with the user.
Low. This is a jus-
tified collection 
to operate the 
Wi-Fi network 
and is disaggre-
gated from any 
individual.
Yes. Yes. This data 
will be useful 
and does not 
contain sensitive 
information.
MAC addresses 
of passers-by
Would allow 
analyses of how 
people move 
through the city
High. Using 
these data, it 
would be possi-
ble to track peo-
ple’s movements 
throughout the 
city.
High. This 
data would be 
collected from 
individuals who 
did not agree to 
any terms and 
are not using the 
service provided. 
Probably, 
depending on 
jurisdiction and 
interpretation 
of open records 
laws.
No. This data 
could be useful, 
but involves col-
lecting sensitive 
information and 
likely generating 
public pushback.
61 Bernard Marr, “Why Data Minimization Is An Important Concept In The Age of Big Data,” Forbes, March 16, 2016. http://www.forbes.
com/sites/bernardmarr/2016/03/16/why-data-minimization-is-an-important-concept-in-the-age-of-big-data/ 
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IN PRACTICE
Among of the key types of data collected by the sensors in Chicago’s Array of Things project 
are pedestrian, bicycle, and automobile counts, which are calculated by analyzing with computer 
vision algorithms images taken by a camera on every sensor. While pedestrian and vehicle counts 
are not themselves sensitive, the images necessary to compute these metrics are: because the 
images can include identifiers such as faces and license plates, an extensive backlog of pictures or 
video from all the City’s sensors would pose a significant privacy risk.
Recognizing these risks, the City of Chicago developed a plan to minimize the collection of these 
images by computing traffic counts on-board the sensors themselves, and then discarding the 
images and storing only the counts. This means that the images never need to be stored outside 
the cameras or beyond the time it takes to calculate the desired metrics. 
In addition, while it is necessary to collect and store some images for the purpose of calibrating the 
sensors, the amount of content is limited to only the quantity necessary for this purpose, and access 
to the images is severely restricted. The program’s privacy policy62 describes its approach as follows:
62Array of Things, “Array of Things Operating Policies,”  https://arrayofthings.github.io/final-policies.html.
“For the purposes of instrument calibration, testing, and software enhancement, images 
and audio files that may contain non-sensitive PII will be periodically collected to improve, 
develop, and enhance algorithms that could detect and report on conditions such as noted 
above. This raw calibration data will be stored in a secure facility for processing only by 
authorized researchers during the course of the Array of Things project, including for purposes 
of improving the technology to protect this non-sensitive PII. Access to this limited volume of 
data is restricted to operator employees, contractors and approved scientific partners who 
need to process the data for instrument design and calibration purposes. All individuals with 
access to this data will be subject to strict contractual confidentiality obligations and will be 
subject to discipline and/or termination if they fail to meet these obligations.”
The Array of Things’ approach to managing these images responsibly restricts privacy risks by 
minimizing data collection while simultaneously retaining all benefits from having the cameras in place.
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Among the biggest challenges in protecting privacy is keeping track of data and privacy risks. Cities 
maintain numerous datasets — often distributed across many different departments — making it 
difficult for cities to keep track of their many data resources. Without a comprehensive knowledge of 
available datasets, cities may make poor data management decisions or undertake redundant data 
collection efforts. 
Furthermore, unknown and insufficiently monitored datasets pose privacy risks: it is impossible to 
mitigate risks that no one knows exists. Sensitive data that is not actively monitored will not be 
properly protected, increasing the likelihood that private information will be disclosed as open data 
or through public records requests. Personnel turnover and regular upgrades to records management 
systems add to the difficulty of properly evaluating an old dataset for privacy risks. The rapid pace 
of developments in data analytics is especially troubling, as it means that the risks in a dataset are 
constantly evolving even when the data remains unchanged. 
Managing privacy requires knowing what data the city possesses and what 
privacy risks that data poses. Data inventories and privacy grading schemas 
are effective ways to enable the auditing of data for privacy risks.
MAINTAIN: KEEP TRACK OF  
PRIVACY RISKS IN ALL DATA  
STORED AND MAINTAINED.
2.2
TAKE ACTION 
It is critical for cities to maintain a detailed inventory of existing data in order to evaluate their data ecosystem and streamline privacy 
protection at each phase of the data lifecycle.
LOW: Minimally sensitive 
information is contained or 
could be revealed
MEDIUM: Mildly sensitive 
information is contained or 
could be revealed
HIGH: Very sensitive 
information is contained or 
could be revealed
LOW: Targeted effort re-
quired for each individual, 
requires the use of  
unique data
Low risk
MEDIUM: A single method 
can be used to learn about 
some people in the data, 
and uses data that is avail-
able for some people
Medium risk
HIGH: A single method 
can be used to learn about 
most people in the data, 
and uses data that is avail-
able for most people 
High risk
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Data inventories should ensure that datasets contain thorough metadata, answering questions such as:
•  What do the fields and entries mean?
•  What internal process does the data represent? How is the data generated?
•  What records management system generates the data? 
•  When, how, and why was this dataset created?
•  How does this dataset get used?
•  What other datasets contain similar, redundant, or complementary information?
•  How frequently is the dataset updated?
•  What department(s) and individual(s) are responsible for the data?
•  How long is the mandated retention period? How long does the city intend to retain the data?
This documented information is necessary to enable cities to fully investigate their open data 
ecosystem. Such an inventory will also enable more informed and proactive uses of data throughout 
city hall, and will be massively helpful to consumers of any datasets that are published as open data.
The other key component for a data inventory is evaluating the privacy risks within each dataset. One 
potential approach for incorporating privacy into inventories is to develop grading schemas that 
classify the privacy risks included in every dataset into a small number of categories, such as High, 
Medium, and Low Risk. Such a system could provide a bird’s-eye view of privacy risks, helping the city 
target its resources to mitigate risks and identify good candidate datasets for release as open data.
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Notwithstanding the appeal of such a grading system, cities should be aware of several pitfalls 
inherent in developing a privacy grading system. In particular, the risk scores may not:
•   Provide a full picture of risks and mitigations. It might be simple to make some high-risk datasets 
suitable for release, but difficult for others. 
•   Account for other data that exists and the mosaic effect. Even if a dataset on its own is not 
sensitive, it could pose risks when combined with other open datasets.
•   Consider constituents’ expectations and the relationship between the public and the city. A 
dataset considered high risk by the community in one city might be considered medium risk in 
another (depending on factors such as previous events related to data, the local tech community, 
and the social standing of the government).
With regard to this final point, developing an open data privacy schema presents a perfect 
opportunity to engage the public with respect to priorities related to privacy and open data. 
Asking the public for input is a great way to educate citizens about these issues, gauge their 
priorities, and collaboratively develop standards (see Chapter 4).
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IN PRACTICE
Some cities, states, and the federal government have already developed definitions that are used to 
classify datasets. A few such schemas are summarized below.
A related data classification scheme is Datatags,66 a system developed by Latanya Sweeney at Harvard 
University to help researchers share data without violating privacy laws. Datatags provides users with 
an interactive survey that asks questions about a dataset to determine its level of sensitivity. Data is 
then classified into one of six categories, ranging from “Non-confidential information” to “Maximum 
sensitive personal information.”67 By guiding users through the process of analyzing a dataset for 
privacy concerns, Datatags provides a simple interface to help those without expertise in data privacy 
manage how they share data. Because Datatags is designed to help manage data with respect to a 
specific set of privacy laws, it does not cover privacy risks that may fall outside the coverage of existing 
legislation. Nonetheless, it provides a valuable model for how to develop a simple, user-friendly tool 
for navigating complex data privacy decisions.
64Washington State Office of the Chief Information Officer. “Securing Information Technology Assets.”  (2013) 
65Project Open Data, “Project Open Data Metadata Schema v1.1,”  https://project-open-data.cio.gov/v1.1/schema/#accessLevel 
66Privacy Tools for Sharing Research Data, “DataTags,”  http://datatags.org.
67“DataTags-Compliant Repositories,”  http://datatags.org/datatags-compliant.
CLOSED INTERMEDIATE OPEN
San Francisco63 Protected: this data is pro-
tected by law or regulation 
and can only be shared or 
accessed internally and per 
organizational procedures; OR 
this information includes indi-
vidually identified information.
Sensitive: in its raw form, this 
data poses security concerns, 
could be misused to target 
individuals or poses other 
concerns.
Public: this data could be 
publicly disseminated without 
any concerns
Washington State64 Confidential Information: data 
is specifically protected from 
disclosure by law.
Confidential Information 
Requiring Special Handling: 
data is specifically protected 
from disclosure by law and 
subject to strict handling 
requirements dictated by 
statutes, regulations, or legal 
agreements.
Sensitive Information: data 
may not be specifically 
protected from disclosure 
by law and is for official use 
only. Sensitive information 
is generally not released to 
the public unless specifically 
requested.
Public Information: data can 
be or currently is released to 
the public. It does not need 
protection from unauthorized 
disclosure, but does need 
integrity and availability pro-
tection controls.
Data.gov65 Non-public: data could never 
be made available to the 
public for privacy, security, or 
other reasons as determined 
by your agency.
Restricted Public: data is only 
available under certain condi-
tions or to certain audiences 
(such as researchers who sign 
a waiver)
Public: data are or could be 
made publicly available to all 
without restrictions
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Preparing datasets to be released is one of the most common challenges faced by open data 
initiatives, as it is not always clear if the data poses privacy risks and, if so, how to manage those risks. 
As described in Section 1.2, open data can compromise individual privacy in numerous ways that 
involve a variety of data types. It is only possible to mitigate these risks by first identifying the risks 
that are present. This section provides guidelines for evaluating datasets for privacy risks and sensitive 
information, and what de-identification techniques may be effective at mitigating these risks. 
Open data can pose privacy risks in a variety of ways. Responsibly releas-
ing data requires a thorough analysis of privacy risks and the use of a wide 
range of de-identification techniques.
RELEASE: EVALUATE DATASETS FOR 
PRIVACY RISKS AND MITIGATE THOSE 
RISKS BEFORE RELEASING DATA.
2.3
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TAKE ACTION 
The following questionnaire is designed to help data owners identify and mitigate the privacy risks of a dataset before sharing it. It aims to 
highlight the diverse privacy risks that can exist within the datasets that cities are likely to share. Because of the highly contextual nature of 
open data privacy risks, the mitigating actions listed are suggestive rather than prescriptive; any determination of exactly how to prepare 
datasets for release must be made based on the particular risks and benefits involved.
ATTRIBUTE RISK DESCRIPTION EXAMPLE(S) MITIGATING ACTION(S)
Category 1:  
Individual  
identifiers
Does the data contain 
information and  
attributes directly tied 
to an individual?
Many types of infor-
mation can be used 
to identify individuals 
within a dataset. Even 
if a field does not by 
itself identify an indi-
vidual, it can be used 
in conjunction with 
other fields to do so.
•  Name
•  Sex
•  Race
•  Address
•  Birthdate
•  Phone number
•  User ID
•  License plate
Reduce the precision of 
these fields or remove them 
entirely.
Does the data contain 
repeated records 
of an individual’s 
actions?
Behavioral records, of-
ten known as metada-
ta, describe detailed 
and unique patterns 
of behavior that make 
it easy to identify 
individuals and learn 
intimate details about 
that person.
•   User IDs in records 
of bikeshare usage
•   License plates in 
records of taxi trips
Remove the fields that 
provide references to 
individuals, so that records 
cannot be connected based 
on the person. Or provide 
anonymous identifiers in 
place of these individual 
IDs, ensuring that they 
are randomly generated 
and there is no systematic 
connection between the 
original and anonymized IDs 
(such as alphabetical order).
Category 2:  
References  
to location
Does the dataset 
contain references to 
locations?
Location data is often 
highly identifiable and 
can reveal particularly 
sensitive details about 
individuals.
•   Addresses of inci-
dents in 911 reports
•   Pickup and dropoff 
location of taxi trips
Remove these fields or 
reduce the precision (i.e., 
generalize street address 
into zip code).
Does the dataset 
contain geographic 
coordinates?
Although not hu-
man-interpretable, 
geographic coordi-
nates can be easily 
mapped to a street 
address.
Geographic coordi-
nates for the location 
of 311 requests
Does the dataset contain 
references to locations?
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ATTRIBUTE RISK DESCRIPTION EXAMPLE(S) MITIGATING ACTION(S)
Category 3:  
Sensitive fields  
and subsets
Does the data contain 
any unstructured text 
fields?
Unstructured text 
fields are often used 
in unpredictable 
ways, meaning that 
their publication may 
expose unexpected 
sensitive information.
Permit applications 
that include the ap-
plicant’s explanation 
of why the permit is 
required.
Remove the unstructured 
fields entirely or evaluate 
the entries to check for 
sensitive information.
Does the data contain 
any types of records 
that are particularly 
sensitive?
Certain categories of 
records within a data-
set may be systemat-
ically more sensitive 
than the rest.
Sexual assault inci-
dents within a dataset 
of crime incident 
reports.
Treat these records with 
particular care, either by re-
moving the entries entirely 
or removing/generalizing 
sensitive fields from these 
entries.
Does the data contain 
information that also 
appears in other 
datasets?
Connecting informa-
tion across multiple 
datasets may reveal 
sensitive information 
that is not contained 
within any individual 
dataset. This is known 
as the mosaic effect.
Demographic infor-
mation (e.g., age, 
race, and gender) that 
appears in multiple 
datasets.
Remove or reduce the pre-
cision of any fields that are 
present in other public data.
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IN PRACTICE
One method that can be used to evaluate data for potential privacy concerns is to explicitly attempt to 
re-identify that data before it is shared. While it is perhaps counterintuitive to try to exploit vulnerabilities, 
it is better to identify risks internally rather than only after data is shared publicly. This approach is 
inspired by the idea of penetration testing, which was developed in the context of information security 
to test system robustness by explicitly trying to find and exploit vulnerabilities.68 By performing 
penetration tests in-house, system managers in data security identify and remedy any issues before 
releasing software to the public.
A similar approach could be used to evaluate data for privacy risks before sharing it publicly. We call 
this “re-identification testing.” Open data leaders could work with internal data scientists or trusted 
community partners (such as members of the civic tech community) and have them try to re-identify 
individuals in certain datasets. While this process is more resource-intensive than following rules 
of thumb regarding privacy protection techniques, it is also far more robust at identifying privacy 
vulnerabilities in the data. By identifying the presence and types of privacy risks in a dataset, municipal 
data officers will be able to make more informed risk assessments and decisions regarding whether 
and how to release data.
One framework for re-identification testing is the “motivated intruder” model. This approach imagines 
the presence of an individual who is both technically competent and motivated to access personal 
information using the data. The Information Commissioner’s Office in the UK describes a motivated 
intruder as “a person who starts without any prior knowledge but who wishes to identify the individual 
from whose personal data the anonymised data has been derived,” and explains “This test is meant to 
assess whether the motivated intruder would be successful.”69 The organization conducting a motivated 
intruder test assesses both the potential motivations of an intruder and the methods through which 
someone would go about achieving these aims. By focusing on an individual behind a re-identification 
attack rather than just the data in the abstract, the motivated intruder model provides a structured way 
to think through how a dataset might be used to attack individual privacy.
68Stephen Northcutt et al. “Penetration Testing: Assessing Your Overall Security Before Attackers Do.”  (2006) 
69Information Commissioner’s Office, “Anonymisation: managing data protection risk,”  (2012).
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The last stage of the data lifecycle is retiring data. This involves removing data from open data 
platforms as well as deleting internal records. At this stage, cities must balance the potential benefits 
of retaining data with the privacy risks that this data — and, in particular, the accumulation of many 
years of data — may trigger.
Although modern advances in data storage and data mining algorithms may suggest that more data is 
always better, Bruce Schneier asserts, “data is a toxic asset.”70 When it comes to individual privacy, data 
often has negative retentive value: as datasets grow over time, they acquire more nuanced information 
about more people. The following table summarizes arguments for retaining and deleting data.
As datasets grow and more datasets are published, it becomes easier to 
re-identify individuals and infer information about them. Deleting and un-
publishing data are two strategies to limit the amount of information avail-
able and the concomitant risks to personal privacy.
DELETE: WHERE APPROPRIATE, RETIRE 
DATA STORED INTERNALLY, TURN 
OFF AUTOMATIC COLLECTION, AND 
REMOVE DATA SHARED ONLINE TO 
MITIGATE PRIVACY RISKS THAT RESULT 
FROM THE ACCUMULATION OF DATA.
2.4
70 Bruce Schneier, “Data is a toxic asset, so why not throw it out?,” CNN, March 1, 2016. http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/01/opinions/data-
is-a-toxic-asset-opinion-schneier/index.html.
71de Montjoye et al., “Unique in the Crowd: The privacy bounds of human mobility.”
72de Montjoye et al., “Unique in the shopping mall: On the reidentifiability of credit card metadata.”
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TOPIC PRO: RETAIN DATA CON: DELETE DATA
Inference and analysis Historical data can become valuable when com-
bined with other data or as algorithms develop new 
capabilities. Ten years of data might yield insights 
that one year of data would not. Historical data can 
also be valuable for cities trying to study trends or 
evaluate policies. Good data is critical for effective 
data-driven governance. 
Larger quantities of data provide information about 
more people and yield more information about 
them. Studies have shown that the more data that 
exists the easier it is to identify individuals.71, 72 
Patterns of behavior that may not stand out in data 
about 1,000 taxi trips, for example, may be highly 
unique — and far more revealing — when 10,000 
taxi trips are analyzed. This is especially concerning 
due to public records laws that limit a government’s 
discretion over what data to release (see Section 3.4).
Maintenance Increasing data storage capabilities make retaining 
and using data easy and inexpensive. It may take 
more work to evaluate and delete data than to 
simply leave it alone.
Collecting and maintaining more data than is 
needed requires the use of additional business 
and technical resources to manage inventories and 
workflows. Furthermore, the burden of responding 
to public disclosure requests increases with the 
volume of data maintained.
73President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, “Big Data and Privacy: A Technological Perspective.”
74 Michael Barbaro and Tom Zeller Jr., “A Face Is Exposed for AOL Searcher No. 4417749,” The New York Times, August 9, 2006. www.
nytimes.com/2006/08/09/technology/09aol.html 
75Greg Sadetsky, “AOL search data mirrors,”  http://www.gregsadetsky.com/_aol-data/ 
It is also important to recognize that open data, once released, is forever in the public domain. PCAST 
writes, “given the distributed and redundant nature of data storage, it is not even clear that data can 
be destroyed with any useful degree of assurance. Although research on data destruction is ongoing, 
it is a fundamental fact that at the moment that data are displayed (in ‘analog’) to a user’s eyeballs 
or ears, they can also be copied (‘re-digitized’) without any technical protections.”73 Thus, even if a 
city removes a sensitive dataset from its portal, that data is likely to remain available online through 
channels such as archives and peer-to-peer networks. For example, in 2006 AOL released a dataset 
of 20 million web searches by 650,000 Americans. Even though this data was immediately exposed 
as highly sensitive and AOL quickly removed the data from its own site, to this day the data remains 
accessible online through a quick web search.74, 75
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TAKE ACTION 
Determining whether to retain data or turn off automatic collection processes requires proactive planning and active balancing of poten-
tial benefits and risks. For data that should not be retained or published beyond a predetermined period, cities should build automatic 
deletion into the technology architecture. Cities should also routinely review their automatic collection processes. When deciding to 
retain data (beyond required retention periods), cities should be confident that the data will produce enough value to justify any privacy 
risks. The worst-case scenario is that retained data will produce no positive value but reveal sensitive information about citizens. If data is 
particularly sensitive, there must be valuable uses planned that justify the retention risks. 
LOW: The data has not 
been used
MEDIUM: The data is used 
to create mild impact
HIGH: The data has been 
used to create high impact
LOW: There are no plans to 
use the data
Low benefit
MEDIUM: There are tenta-
tive plans to use the data 
to create mild impact 
Medium benefit
HIGH: There are clear plans 
to use the data to create 
high impact
High benefit
LOW: Minimally sensitive 
information (or mildly sensi-
tive information that is not 
public record)
MEDIUM: Mildly sensitive 
information that is public 
record
HIGH: Very sensitive infor-
mation
LOW: The data does not 
become more sensitive as 
it grows
Low risk
MEDIUM: The data may 
become more sensitive as 
it grows 
Medium risk
HIGH: The data becomes 
more sensitive as it grows
High risk
Cities should follow the following three-step process to determine the value of retaining data:
1. Determine benefits
2. Determine risks
Past value
Impact
Fu
tu
re
 v
al
ue
Sc
al
e 
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LOW MEDIUM HIGH
LOW Retain data or contin-
ue collection
MEDIUM Make determination 
based on the particu-
lar risks and potential 
for effective mitigation
HIGH Delete data or stop 
collection
3. Balance benefits and risks Benefit
R
is
k
If the decision is made to remove existing open data from an online portal, it is important to:
•   Determine who uses the data, and communicate with any businesses, organizations, or individuals 
that rely on the data.
•   Explain to the public why data is being removed, making it clear that data is being removed to 
protect privacy rather than to subvert transparency, and clarify the timeline for this process.
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IN PRACTICE
In order to improve its ability to recover stolen cars, the Seattle Police Department (SPD) 
implemented Automatic License Plate Recognition (ALPR) technology on several of its patrol 
cars. When these patrol cars were in service, the ALPRs read license plates that came in view and 
associated it with GPS location data. Images of these plates were then translated into text data, 
which was stored on an internal server along with the location at which that license plate had 
appeared, to be cross-referenced whenever a vehicle was reported as stolen. 
When the ACLU submitted a public records request in 2011 for data from the SPD’s license plate 
reader program, they found that the City possessed multiple years worth of license plate scans: 
their database contained 7.3 million records of license plates and locations from a three-year 
period.76 This was especially concerning given that only 7,244 (0.1%) of the records contained hits 
on stolen vehicles. The ACLU mined this database to learn behavioral patterns and location history 
of officers (only to demonstrate the sensitivity of this information), and presumed that it could 
do much of the same for the people whose cars had been scanned. Given that most people are 
identifiable from just a few spatiotemporal (location and time) data points of behavior,77, 78 the data 
collected by the SPD — and available to anyone who submitted a public records request —could 
reveal sensitive behavioral patterns about many individuals.
Because the SPD had not developed a retention policy at the point of the ACLU’s public records 
request, it had simply stored all of the records even beyond the time that the data was being used. 
The vast quantity of data meant that it was possible to learn about more people and with a greater 
level of detail than if only the most recent records had been available. After this incident, retention 
policies for license plate data were changed to require that records be kept for no more than 90 days.79
76 Jamela Debelak, “ALPR: The Surveillance Tool You’ve Probably Never Heard Of,” May 20, 2013. https://aclu-wa.org/blog/alpr-
surveillance-tool-you-ve-probably-never-heard 
77de Montjoye et al., “Unique in the shopping mall: On the reidentifiability of credit card metadata.”
78de Montjoye et al., “Unique in the Crowd: The privacy bounds of human mobility.”
79 Brian M. Rosenthal, “Police cameras busy snapping license plates,” The Seattle Times, August 3, 2013. www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/police-cameras-busy-snapping-license-plates/
Cities must develop rigorous and robust approaches to managing privacy in open data. Although 
privacy management is often seen as restrictive, it is a fundamental component of innovative and 
data-driven policy. Because many of the most ambitious efforts in government involve the use 
of data, they will not be possible without effective privacy management. Marc Groman, Senior 
Adviser for Privacy at the Office of Management and Budget, describes privacy’s role as follows: 
Protecting privacy is the responsibility of everyone in a city who collects, 
manages, or uses data. Thorough organizational structures and processes 
are robust ways to ensure that privacy is managed responsibly.
DEVELOP OPERATIONAL 
STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES 
THAT CODIFY PRIVACY 
MANAGEMENT WIDELY 
THROUGHOUT THE CITY.
3. 
80Aitoro, “Defining privacy protection by acknowledging what it’s not.”
81Derek E Bambauer, “Privacy Versus Security,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 103, no. 3 (2013).
“if you have a well-resourced, well-functioning privacy program, that program will promote 
innovation, will actually foster and enable more information sharing and allow agencies to 
expand to new technologies such as the cloud or mobile [...] if you have the right talent in a 
privacy program, then all initiatives and the agency’s mission ultimately will be improved and 
will be able to accomplish more things and better things for the American people.”80
In other words, effective privacy management is essential to maximizing the impact of open data. 
Without the ability to manage and mitigate privacy risks, open data programs and the city as a 
whole will not be able to realize the full potential of collecting, using, and sharing its data.
Building effective privacy management requires an internal appreciation for the value and role of 
privacy. While all cities are familiar with the related area of data security, privacy is a relatively new 
area of focus. Although privacy and security are related, Derek Bambauer explains that they “are 
distinct concerns. Privacy establishes a normative framework for deciding who should legitimately 
have the capability to access and alter information. Security implements those choices.”81 The field 
of information security has developed process-based standards that emphasize best practices to 
minimize the risks of breaches, and evaluates efforts based on their adherence to this process rather 
than on particular outcomes. Drawing on this tradition in security, and given that it is impossible 
to guarantee perfect data anonymity, Ira Rubinstein and Woodrow Hartzog write, “the best way to 
move data release policy past the alleged failures of anonymization is to focus on the process of 
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minimizing risk of reidentification and sensitive attribute disclosure, not preventing harm. Process-
based data release policy, which resembles the law of data security, will help us move past the 
limitations of focusing on whether data sets have been “anonymized.’”82
Effective open data management must therefore be operationalized at the process level in 
addition to the data level. This Chapter focuses on strategies and processes to institutionalize the 
privacy management practices described in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2.
82Rubinstein and Hartzog, “Anonymization and Risk.”
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As described in Chapter 1, the privacy risks of open data are diverse. The breakdown of the 
PII framework means that there are no simple, formulaic answers for when data is sensitive nor 
easy answers that will ensure data can be safely released. Data can be sensitive in ways that are 
unexpected to those who are unfamiliar with re-identification. On the other hand, that some risks 
to privacy will inevitably exist does not mean that cities should simply stop releasing data.
Furthermore, Chapter 2 explains how privacy is a critical consideration at all stages of the data 
lifecycle: when data is collected, as data is managed, when datasets are released, and as data is 
deleted. Every group that collects, uses, or shares data makes decisions that implicate privacy; 
many such decisions are made throughout city hall every day.
The scale and complexity of managing privacy makes it infeasible for cities to ignore privacy 
considerations or assign all responsibility to a single individual. Instead, effectively managing 
privacy requires a diverse team that collectively spans city hall and is capable of considering 
privacy in connection with every decision regarding data. Furthermore, due to the diversity of 
privacy risks, groups responsible for privacy must work together to avoid sensitive information 
falling through the cracks.
The responsibility for managing privacy in open data spans every office in 
city hall. Assembling privacy-conscious teams and processes is critical for 
managing diverse privacy risks.
INCREASE INTERNAL AWARENESS OF 
AND ATTENTION TO PRIVACY RISKS.
3.1
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TAKE ACTION 
Cities should develop comprehensive systems and processes, along with tailored training for each role, to manage privacy. The following 
table describes the key positions that every city should have, and their primary roles and responsibilities. Along with others such as 
community members, these people should also form a citywide Privacy Review Board (inspired by Institutional Review Boards, or IRBs, 
that oversee studies on humans to ensure they are conducted legally and ethically).
TITLE ROLE
What is their general mission?
TRAINING
What do they need to know?
DATA RELEASE PROCESS 
RESPONSIBILITIES
What is their role in releasing 
open data?
Chief Privacy Officer •   Lead citywide efforts 
to manage and protect 
privacy
•   Emphasize that privacy is 
an integral part of open 
data, not just a hurdle.
•   How to manage a priva-
cy-conscious organization.
•   How to engage the public 
about data and privacy.
•   Manage data preparation 
for particularly challenging 
datasets.
•   Lead regular risk assess-
ments of open data data-
sets and processes.
Open Data Team •   Determine how data is 
released.
•   Evaluate the ecosystem 
of data available on the 
portal.
•   Advise departments how to 
prepare sensitive data for 
release.
•   The diversity of re-identifi-
cation risks and re-identifi-
cation techniques.
•   How to mitigate re-iden-
tification risks to make 
datasets appropriate for 
public consumption.
•   Best practices for manag-
ing public relations regard-
ing data privacy.
•   Work with Department 
Privacy Officers to perform 
privacy risk assessments on 
data being considered for 
release.
•   Ensure that datasets being 
released have thorough 
metadata that describe any 
protections taken to pro-
tect privacy in the data.
Department Data  
or Privacy Officer
•   Manage data and privacy 
within a particular depart-
ment or small number of 
departments.
•   Fluency with the types of 
data used by that officer’s 
department(s).
•   Best practices for manag-
ing privacy throughout the 
data lifecycle.
•   Overview of re-identifica-
tion risks and mitigations.
•   Curate datasets within 
departments.
•   Provide comprehensive 
metadata on datasets be-
ing considered for release.
•   Perform risk assessment on 
departmental data to de-
termine how it might reveal 
insights about individuals.
City Attorney •   Advise individuals and 
groups throughout the City 
regarding the laws behind 
data management and 
privacy.
•   Pertinent privacy and open 
records laws.
•   Potential liabilities for 
releasing data.
•   Best practices in privacy 
management.
•   Identify if the data (in 
whole or in part) is public 
record.
•   Determine if any of the 
dataset is affected by 
privacy laws.
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IN PRACTICE
As part of its Privacy Program, the City of Seattle released in February 2016 an Open Data Policy that 
defined a variety of roles involved in curating, releasing, and maintaining open data.83 These positions 
are defined in the Policy as follows:
Seattle’s policy also dictates the responsibilities of each position. For example, the Chief Privacy 
Officers’ responsibilities include:84
•   “Serve as the arbiter of any questions or issues concerning Open Data privacy risk and solutions for 
minimizing the risk of privacy harm.”
•   “Resolve questions or issues regarding open data privacy risk escalated by the Open Data Manager.”
•   “Participate in the annual risk assessment for the Open Data Program” (see Section 3.2).
The City of Boston maintains similar roles for its open data program. In order to help its open data 
program scale, in July 2016 the City of Boston reformed its process for how data is reviewed before 
being published. While Boston’s open data portal had been operational since 2012, the City for many 
years had no formal process dictating how to prepare data for publication. In fact, the open data 
program manager often remarked that he did not know who had collected and uploaded a particular 
dataset, or why. This meant that there was no comprehensive inventory of the City’s open data nor 
83 City of Seattle. “Open Data Policy.”  (2016) http://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/SeattleGovPortals/CityServices/
OpenDataPolicyV1.pdf.
84Ibid.
TITLE DESCRIPTION
Open Data Manager A City employee who is responsible for the City of Seattle’s Open Data Program, stewards the data 
made available on the Open Data Portal, and manages the Open Data Team.
Open Data Team City employees who administer the Open Data Portal and provide planning, review, coordination, and 
technical support to City departments and offices publishing open data.
Data Owner Any City employee who is responsible for one or more departmental datasets.
Open Data Champion Designated by each department, this person serves as the point of contact and coordinator for that 
department’s publishing of Open Data.
Chief Privacy Officer A City employee who provides overall leadership and direction to the City of Seattle Privacy Program 
and is responsible for resolving questions and issues concerning privacy risk and Open Data. 
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any ability to understand previous open data decisions. Given the many different groups involved 
in the publishing process, it was critical to develop procedures that clarified everyone’s roles. The 
final review process (Figure 6) provides clear guidance as to how various City stakeholders should 
collaborate to ensure that data is properly vetted and prepared before publishing.
Figure 6. City of Boston dataset approval and publication process
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The rapidly shifting landscape of Big Data and privacy means that is impossible to future-
proof datasets and data release processes. Constant changes in technology, policy, and public 
perceptions regularly challenge previously held assumptions about what data is safe to release. 
Such changes can come from many directions, such as:
•   More powerful re-identification techniques that emerge over time increase what can be inferred 
from a dataset, potentially rendering earlier mitigation approaches untenable.
•   New datasets (on the open data portal and elsewhere) increase the potential for re-identification 
through the mosaic effect (i.e., linking information across datasets), and increase the potential 
negative impact of such re-identifications.
•   Personnel turnover and changes in internal structures may diminish the institutional capacity and 
knowledge needed to effectively manage data privacy.
•   Developments in the national and local discourse about privacy — perhaps resulting from 
privacy scandals related to the government or a private company — can alter the public’s faith 
in government as a data steward and willingness to accept privacy risk as a cost of open data.
As more data is released and the privacy landscape evolves, previously  
acceptable data practices may no longer be appropriate. Regularly  
evaluating approaches to data privacy will help characterize and mitigate 
any privacy risks that have emerged.
PERIODICALLY AUDIT DATA AND 
PROCESSES TO ENSURE PRIVACY 
STANDARDS CONTINUE TO BE UPHELD.
3.2
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TAKE ACTION 
Cities should undergo regular audits (e.g., annually) to ensure that their data and processes achieve desired levels of privacy protection, 
and should document the results of these audits. This requires evaluating the program’s past performance in protecting privacy and any 
broad shifts that have occurred in the data and privacy landscape. The answers to these questions will help cities evaluate their open data 
program’s performance and identify necessary changes.
PAST PERFORMANCE
How well has the city managed open data and  
privacy in the past?
LANDSCAPE SHIFTS
What recent developments require updated  
processes?
Data and algorithms •   What is the current risk assessment of every data-
set available?
•   How do today’s risk assessments compare with 
those from when the data was released?
•   What re-identifications have occurred based on 
the available data?
•   What new datasets have been made available 
since the last audit?
•   What are the new forms of re-identification attacks 
that have emerged since the last audit?
•   What inferences are possible by combining all the 
data on the portal?
•   What new types of data have been made public 
beyond our open data portal (or are collected by 
private actors) that could be linked with the data 
we have made available? 
•   How does the data we have released compare 
with those available from other cities? 
Process •   How effective is our process for releasing data?
•   Is it timely?
•   Is every task covered by someone with the appro-
priate expertise?
•   Has sensitive information been inadvertently 
released? If so, how did it happen?
•   How has the organizational structure of City Hall 
changed?
•  What shifts in personnel have occurred?
•   What gaps in expertise and process have been 
emerged?
Public •   How effective has our public engagement been? 
(see Chapter 4)
•   Have there been any incidents of negative feed-
back from the public regarding privacy?
•   How have public perceptions of privacy shifted 
since our last audit? 
•  What issues of privacy have dominated the news?
•   Have there been any privacy scandals (related 
to our city, neighboring jurisdictions, or state or 
federal governments) that could influence public 
trust related to data?
•  What best practices have emerged in other cities?
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IN PRACTICE
In 2016, Seattle committed to performing an annual risk assessment of its open data ecosystem. The 
City’s Open Data Policy states that it will “Perform an annual risk assessment of both the Open Data 
Program and the content available on the Open Data Portal. The outcome of this review shall be 
shared with the Open Data Champions, who will help implement risk mitigation strategies.”85
Seattle’s initial risk assessment is being conducted in partnership with the Future of Privacy Forum 
(FPF).  FPF will evaluate Seattle’s existing open data inventory, and will also spend time in City Hall to 
gauge the efficacy of Seattle’s approaches and processes for managing data privacy. An excerpt from 
FPF’s Statement of Work is shown below.
85Ibid.
86Future of Privacy Forum, “Future of Privacy Forum,”  https://fpf.org 
FPF’S STATEMENT OF WORK
FPF will produce a public-facing report on the City of Seattle’s Open Data program. The risk assessment meth-
odology and report will be based on review of a subset of high-risk agencies or data sets, as well as a random 
sample of additional agencies or data sets. FPF will evaluate the process in place to determine the risk of 
re-identification in case of release of individual data sets or multiple data sets. Within this scope of review, FPF 
will
• Assess the municipal open data landscape and identify inherent risks.
•  Assess the City of Seattle as a model municipality, its organizational structure and data handling  
practices related to Open Data, and identify potential risks.
• Identify data privacy, security, and handling risks as they apply to an open data program.
• Develop a template/framework that facilitates the scoring of risk in the areas identified.
•  Apply the framework through an assessment of the City’s current Open Data Program, any mitigating activi-
ties, and measure residual risk.
• Propose recommendations to mitigate risk to acceptable levels.
• Issue a report that will be shared publicly with the Seattle community.
•  Share the risk management methodology, tools, and other collateral publicly to benefit other  
municipalities.
• Promote the report and project through submissions for IAPP conferences and publications.
Where possible, the risk assessment methodology and related tools and controls will be based on an open 
framework such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800 series (e.g. 
800-30, 800-37, 800-53).
Public records laws refer to statutes stipulating that certain government data, when it has been 
requested by a member of the public, must be released. The most well-known of these statutes is 
the Freedom of Information Act, or FOIA, that dictates the release of information from the Federal 
Government unless a particular exception bars its release; every state also has a public records 
law. These laws are designed to promote transparency in government by guaranteeing public 
access to government information. Yet while the release of public records is an effective tool to 
enhance government transparency, such releases involve making data public and therefore also 
have important implications with regard to privacy. Coordination is essential.
Although public records laws do not dictate open data policies, there are strong connections 
between the two given that both involve sharing government data with the public. Whereas open 
data is proactive, meaning that cities choose what data to release, public records are inherently 
reactive: cities must share whatever information is requested (barring exemptions, see below). 
This means that whereas cities have discretion over how to publicly share data on open data 
portals, public records laws often force cities’ hands into releasing information that might implicate 
individual privacy. In other words, while all open data is public record, not all public records should 
be open data.
Public records laws typically contain a number of exemptions setting forth categories within 
which government data is not required to be released even when requested. For example, the 
Massachusetts public records law has over 20 such exemptions, covering reasons such as statutory 
restrictions, law enforcement investigations, and privacy.87 Yet an official guide to the law (and 
applicable case law) emphasizes that these exemptions should be “narrowly construed” in order 
to serve overall transparency goals, meaning that exemptions should limit the release of public 
records only in specific situations.88 The privacy exemption itself is quite specific, covering
Public records laws compel governments to release data requested by  
citizens, meaning that even when a city might not have proactively  
published data, information may still be made public through a different 
channel. Cities should therefore limit the data they collect and store, while 
also tapping into public records requests and coordinating public records 
and open data processes so as to better understand and serve public  
interest in data.
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ACCOUNT FOR THE UNIQUE RISKS  
AND OPPORTUNITIES PRESENTED BY 
PUBLIC RECORDS LAWS.
3.3
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only “personnel and medical files or information; also any other materials or data relating to a 
specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy.” 89  The strictness of the privacy exemption means that only “intimate details of a 
highly personal nature” (such as substance abuse, government assistance, and family reputation) 
data could be withheld from public disclosure due to privacy considerations.90 Much of the 
information that creates risks in open data would not be exempt. Thus, while public records laws 
contain exemptions, these are not reliable protectors of individual privacy. 
87 Massachusetts Public Records Definition. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 4, § 7(26).
88William Francis Galvin. “A Guide to the Massachusetts Public Records Law.”  (2013) http://www.sec.state.ma.us/pre/prepdf/guide.pdf.
89Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 4, § 7(26).
90Attorney General v. Assistant Commissioner of the Real Property Department of Boston, 380 623 (1980).
TAKE ACTION 
Cities should always be mindful of the implications public records laws may have for them. Below are several actions that cities can 
follow to take advantage of public records laws while mitigating the risks they pose.
ACTION DESCRIPTION
Limit collection of 
sensitive data that 
would be public 
record.
Data that is public record can be released into the public domain whether or not it is proactively  
released as open data: the public can compel the government to release this information by filing  
a public records request. Before collecting new data, therefore, it is critical to determine what  
information would be a public record. If this data is sensitive, it is often best not to collect it in the first 
place as it otherwise could be released whenever requested (see Section 2.1 for guidelines on  
limiting data collection).
Delete sensitive 
information that is 
public record.
When maintaining data, audit existing inventories to determine what sensitive information is public re-
cord. Given the potential for public disclosure of sensitive data at any time, delete data that is no longer 
generating enough value to merit the privacy risk (assuming that it has been stored for the  
mandated retention period; see Section 2.4 for guidelines on deleting data).
Release frequently 
requested  
information as  
public records.
When deciding what datasets are good candidates to become open data, consider those that are often 
subject to public records requests. Such datasets are of clear public interest. Furthermore, releasing these 
datasets will reduce the burden of fulfilling public records requests: a recent study of FOIL requests to 
New York State’s Department of Environmental Conservation found that the Department “could reduce 
FOIL requests by 50% by publishing frequently FOILed data.”91
91 Reinvent Albany. “Listening to FOIL: Using FOIL Logs to Guide the Publication of Open Data.”  (2014)
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IN PRACTICE
One example of sensitive data being released through public records requests comes from the 
case study presented in Section 1.3. To recap: in response to a Freedom of Information Law request, 
New York City released data detailing every taxi ride recorded in registered NYC taxis in 2013.92 
The data contained information about pick up time and location, drop off time and locations, and 
the taxi cab and driver involved in each trip. As described in Section 1.3, one data scientist used 
this information to re-identify the drivers involved in every trip.
Another data scientist, Anthony Tockar, took the taxi data and analyzed the patterns of trips. To 
show how the trips could reveal sensitive information beyond the identities of taxi drivers, he 
focused on studying the behavioral trends of visitors to a strip club in New York City.93  Tockar 
mapped out the dropoff location of every taxi trip that began outside a particular strip club in 
Hell’s Kitchen between midnight and 6am. By looking for locations at which many taxi trips ended, 
Tockar was able identify where frequent visitors lived. Due to the precision of the geographic 
coordinates provided, Tockar “was able to pinpoint certain individuals with high probability.”94 
Combining this data with auxiliary information available online enabled easy re-identification. 
Tockar writes, 
 
 
 
That such information was made available through public records requests indicates that non-
exempt government information can contain sensitive information about individuals. The privacy 
exemptions in public records laws are defined following the traditional PII framework, and are 
therefore not designed to protect against re-identification related to the quasi identifiers in data 
such as taxi trips. It is therefore critical to be diligent when releasing open data about privacy above 
and beyond the particular privacy exemptions within public records laws. Open data officials need 
to work closely with individuals responsible for responding to public records requests, and cities 
should require these efforts be coordinated to the maximum extent possible..
Examining one of the clusters in the map above revealed that only one of the 5 likely drop-off 
addresses was inhabited; a search for that address revealed its resident’s name. In addition, 
by examining other drop-offs at this address, I found that this gentleman also frequented 
such establishments as “Rick’s Cabaret” and “Flashdancers”. Using websites like Spokeo and 
Facebook, I was also able to find out his property value, ethnicity, relationship status, court 
records and even a profile picture!”95 
92Whong, “FOILing NYC’s Taxi Trip Data”.
93Tockar, “Riding with the Stars: Passenger Privacy in the NYC Taxicab Dataset”. 
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
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Figure 7. Taxi trip dropoff locations
“ This map shows the dropoff locations of all taxi rides that started outside Larry Flynt’s Hustler 
Club between midnight and 6am during 2013. The yellow markers reflect clusters - several points 
that occur close to each other - and may be interpreted in some cases as individuals who visit the 
club frequently.”
From Anthony Tockar, “Riding with the Stars: Passenger Privacy in the NYC Taxicab Dataset,” https://research.neustar.biz/2014/09/15/riding-
with-the-stars-passenger-privacy-in-the-nyc-taxicab-dataset/.
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Most discussions of open data emphasize the full release of raw, granular data. Yet although there 
are many benefits to sharing government data, the privacy risks involved mean that it does not 
always make sense to make a raw dataset publicly available to anyone and everyone.
Nonetheless, datasets that are too sensitive to fully open up are often those with the most potential 
value for novel analyses and impactful applications. These datasets must move beyond the walls 
of city halls without becoming truly open to the entire public. This means that cities must deploy 
tiered-access structures that allow for carefully tailored levels of data openness.
The Open Data institute98 has developed a Data Spectrum that distinguishes openness across the 
five following categories:97,98
•   Closed data: “Data that can only be accessed by its subject, owner or holder.” 
 
•   ●Shared data 
● • Named access: “data that is shared only with named people or organisations”
● •  Attribute-based access: “data that available to specific groups who meet certain 
criteria”
● •  Public access: “data that is available to anyone under terms and conditions that are  
not ‘open’” 
•   Open data: “Data that anyone can access, use, and share”. 
The Data Spectrum framework highlights that there are many options available for cities to share 
data that go beyond the binary notion of releasing or withholding information.
Publicly releasing full datasets is not always the best strategy for  
capturing benefits while mitigating risks. Developing and using a wide range 
of data-sharing strategies will help ensure that data is shared responsibly 
and effectively.
DEVELOP A PORTFOLIO OF 
APPROACHES FOR RELEASING AND 
SHARING DATA.
3.4
96 Open Data Institute, “Open Data Institute,”  http://theodi.org.
97”The Data Spectrum,” http://theodi.org/data-spectrum.
98Ellen Broad, “Closed, shared, open data: what’s in a name?,”  https://theodi.org/blog/closed-shared-open-data-whats-in-a-name.
By enabling cities to share data with researchers, government agencies, and other trusted 
organizations, the five tiers of shared data listed by the Open Data Institute are critical for 
maximizing the possibilities of municipal data. Since trusted groups are among the most likely to 
use open data, sharing with only them can allow cities to capture most of the benefits that fully 
open data would realize without exposing people’s privacy to the same risks.
From The Data Spectrum, http://theodi.org/data-spectrum.
Figure 8. Open data spectrum
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99 ”BOS:311,”  https://311.boston.gov 
100City of Boston, “311, Service Requests,”  https://data.cityofboston.gov/City-Services/311-Service-Requests/awu8-dc52.
101 O’Brien, Gordon, and Baldwin, “Caring about the community, counteracting disorder: 311 reports of public issues as expressions of 
territoriality.”; Daniel Tumminelli O’Brien, Robert J Sampson, and Christopher Winship, “Ecometrics in the Age of Big Data: Measuring 
and Assessing “Broken Windows” Using Large-scale Administrative Records,” Sociological Methodology 45 (2015).
TAKE ACTION 
Cities should consider the results of the risk assessments from Chapter 1 when determining how to share data as well as whether to 
share it. Data that a) has large potential benefits if shared, but b) involve particularly sensitive information, are good candidates for the 
intermediate levels of the Open Data Spectrum described above. For these datasets, contractual arrangements allow cities to leverage 
partners such as academic researchers and other government agencies while minimizing the privacy risks to the individuals whose data 
is being shared.
To improve the process of sharing data, open data programs should:
•   Develop model Data Use Agreements and Memorandums of Understanding that can be tailored 
for many datasets and partners. These agreements can ensure proper use of sensitive data by 
explicitly limiting the uses of the data (such as using the data to re-identify individuals), identifying 
the party responsible for maintaining confidentiality, establishing policies regarding reuse of the 
data, and providing a structure for penalties if data is used inappropriately.
•   Require that researchers requesting data beyond what is appropriate for open data provide clear 
justifications for the data they desire. Even though the data will be provided with restrictions on 
sharing and uses, it is still best practice to avoid unnecessarily sharing sensitive information. 
•   Consider the social status of the external partner to ensure public support for sharing the data. 
The public may be more comfortable with data being shared with another governmental agency 
to benefit the community than with a private company to help them profit. 
 
•  Document the steps taken to enable and ensure tiered access.
99https://311.boston.gov 
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IN PRACTICE
Since 2009, The City of Boston has maintained a smartphone application to support constituent 
requests for service through its 311 system.  When someone submits a 311 request through the 
app, their request and location are recorded, along with (if submitted) the user’s name, user ID, 
and email. Boston makes some information from these constituent requests available on its open 
data portal.  Due to privacy concerns, the open dataset does not include personal information 
about the individuals who submitted requests. This is sensible, given that such data could be used 
to identify individuals and learn about their lives.
In addition to sharing a subset of data through its open data portal, Boston also shares the raw 
dataset with researchers through data sharing agreements, which provide full access to the data 
but prohibit sharing it with anyone not a party to the agreement. Such partnerships have led to 
numerous analyses and research papers, with insights related to the motivations and behaviors 
of those who report issues.  The lessons learned from this research have fed back into the 
development of future versions of the 311 system, thereby making the data sharing agreements 
an integral component of improving the City’s ability to deliver services. 
100 City of Boston, “311, Service Requests,”  https://data.cityofboston.gov/City-Services/311-Service-Requests/awu8-dc52.
101 O’Brien, Gordon, and Baldwin, “Caring about the community, counteracting disorder: 311 reports of public issues as expressions of 
territoriality.”; Daniel Tumminelli O’Brien, Robert J Sampson, and Christopher Winship, “Ecometrics in the Age of Big Data: Measuring 
and Assessing “Broken Windows” Using Large-scale Administrative Records,” Sociological Methodology 45 (2015).
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Open data is about more than just releasing datasets: it is, as described in an Executive Order 
signed by Barack Obama on his first day of office, essential “to ensure the public trust and establish 
a system of transparency, public participation, and collaboration.”102  While open data initiatives 
often focus on the amount of data made available, Obama’s message is that open data is about 
more than just the data. Recognizing these broader goals allows us to situate open data in its 
proper context: open data is a means toward transparency and accountability, not the end. 
This means that open data initiatives should evaluate their efforts based on the extent to which 
their process of releasing data achieves the underlying goals of transparency and accountability. 
Just like any government program, open data initiatives rely on a series of decisions balancing 
complex and often competing factors. These include what data to release, how to release it, and 
how to make the data valuable. Instead of viewing these challenges as roadblocks hindering their 
progress and requiring opaque decisions, leaders should recognize that open data is designed to 
promote transparency and embrace these challenges as opportunities for collaborative decision-
making with constituents. What better place to pioneer open government processes than a 
program already designed precisely to promote open government?
As the rest of this chapter will show, effective public engagement should be an essential component 
of any open data program. This is especially true when it comes to privacy: since it is generally the 
public’s own privacy at stake, it is essential that citizens have a voice as to how data is released. This 
sense of agency is likely to generate trust in the cities ultimately making decisions. By following the 
principles described in this chapter, open data programs will promote open government far more 
than they would by merely releasing more datasets.
Public support is a prerequisite for successful open data programs. Engag-
ing the public in the development of policies and practices will build vital 
support and drive open data forward.
EMPHASIZE PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT 
AND PUBLIC PRIORITIES AS  
ESSENTIAL ASPECTS OF DATA 
MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS.
4. 
102 Barack Obama, “Transparency and Open Government,” The White House 2009. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
TransparencyandOpenGovernment.
Figure 9.
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A recent Pew Research Center study found that cities have a long way to go to convince the public 
that open data releases are effective.103 Only 7% of Americans feel that local governments are “very 
effective” in sharing data they collect with the public. This number is even lower when it comes 
to public perception of federal government data releases. Citizens also broadly doubt that these 
data disclosures have made government more effective. 
A more nuanced issue rests in the commonly held belief that government open data disclosures 
currently do little to improve government performance. The same Pew study referenced above 
found that only 19% of Americans could think of an example where local government had provided 
useful information about data it collects, and just 9% of Americans think that “the data government 
shares with the public helps a lot with the private sector’s creation of new products and services.”104 
Ultimately, the public is split on whether open data “improves the quality of government services.” 
This perception need not continue to typify engagement with open data, however, as 66% of 
Americans are optimistic that open data may improve government accountability.105  
The public will not accept the privacy risks of open data unless they also 
recognize the value of sharing that data. Building and celebrating success 
encourages more citizens to support open data.
GARNER SUPPORT FOR OPEN DATA 
BY SHARING THE BENEFITS AND 
SUCCESSFUL USES OF OPEN DATA.
4.1
103 Pew Research Center. “Americans’ Views on Open Government Data.”(2015) 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/21/open-government-data/. 
104 Ibid
105 Ibid
From Pew Research Center. “Americans’ Views on Open Government Data.”  (2015) http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/21/open-
government-data/.
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Figure 10.
From Pew Research Center. “Americans’ Views on Open Government Data.”  (2015) http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/21/open-
government-data/.
TAKE ACTION 
Cities can ensure that the public recognizes the value of open data by improving the quantity and quality of its open data, and by 
documenting the positive effects of open data programs.
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106Angarita and The City of Cambridge, “Amplifying Civic Innovation: Community Engagement Strategies for Open Data Collaborations.”
TITLE DESCRIPTION
Engage the community 
about the derived value 
they desire from open data.
•   Analyze historical public records requests to determine what information the public desires. Informa-
tion with a high number of public records requests is of clear public interest and therefore a good 
candidate for open data.
•   Provide potential research directions and applications for open datasets: when publishing datasets, 
include a list of important questions and applications for which this data could be used. Data is only 
as valuable as the ways people use it, and if people do not know what might be a valuable use of 
open data the impacts of open data will be limited. Indeed, a recent study of civic engagement for 
open data found that a “Problem Inventory” was the most highly sought after engagement approach 
among open data users. 
•   Work with civic hackers to help guide the technical development of the open data platform. 
•  Partner with community groups to leverage open data efforts around local issues. Even though these 
 groups may not have as much technical capacity, they often stand the most to gain from new datasets  
 and will have many valuable suggestions for how open data can be used.
Make the data accessible 
with effective formatting 
and clear metadata. Data 
will not provide value if  
it is context-free and  
uninterpretable.
•   Clearly describe what each dataset represents and how it is used internally. 
•   Provide useful column names and interpretable entries (rather than retaining jargon and shorthand).
•   Reduce redundancy by combining datasets related to the same topic. If releasing multiple related 
datasets, format them as consistently as possible (e.g., same column names) to make them easy  
to work with.
Celebrate successful  
uses of open data.
•   Develop an online showcase that highlights effective and innovative open data uses from the  
community. This will help build support for open data while also sparking ideas for future projects by 
showing what is possible.
•  Publish regular reports that include recent uses of open data within the community. Share these  
 positive case studies on social media.
IN PRACTICE
One of the best ways to increase support for future open data endeavors is to demonstrate 
that previous efforts have had positive effects on citizens’ lives. This helps internal stakeholders 
recognize the value of their efforts and generates further enthusiasm for open data throughout in 
the local community. 
Two cities that provide such showcases are San Francisco107 and Philadelphia.108 Their portals 
provide links to a variety of applications that have been made using each city’s respective open 
data, showing the diversity of value that open data has created locally.
107City and County of San Francisco, “SF OpenData Showcase,”  https://data.sfgov.org/showcase 
108 OpenDataPhilly, “Welcome,”  https://www.opendataphilly.org/ 
Figure 11a. Screenshot from San Francisco open data showcase
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City and County of San Francisco, “SF OpenData Showcase,”  https://data.sfgov.org/showcase. 
Figure 11b. Screenshot from Philadelphia open data showcase
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OpenDataPhilly, “Welcome,”  https://www.opendataphilly.org/ 
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As data leaks, cybersecurity hacks, and re-identification attacks grow more common, privacy has 
become an increasingly tangible and salient issue for the public. Cities face an uphill battle on 
this public relations front, as local government data initiatives may be conflated with fears related 
to NSA surveillance. For example, a 2014 Pew Research Center study on public perceptions of 
privacy found that almost 80% of American adults thought that the public should be concerned 
about government surveillance.109  While local governments were not involved in the data collection 
efforts implicated by the Snowden revelations, much of the public will not distinguish between the 
branches of government in their perceptions of trust and privacy. Indeed, a 2015 Pew Research 
Center study found that the public had only marginally more trust in local government than in 
Public trust is critical for supporting open data, yet the public has little  
confidence in the government to responsibly handle data. Data stewards 
can earn public trust through effective communication and responsible  
practices. 
DEVELOP CONSTITUENCY TRUST BY 
CONSIDERING PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS 
AND ACTING AS RESPONSIBLE DATA 
STEWARDS.
4.2
109 Pew Research Center. “Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in the Post-Snowden Era.”  (2014) http://www.pewinternet.
org/2014/11/12/public-privacy-perceptions/.
110 ”Americans’ Views on Open Government Data.”
111 Susan Gunelius. “How and When UK Consumers Will Share Private Data with Brands.” Corporate Eye  (2013) http://www.corporate-eye.
com/main/how-and-when-uk-consumers-will-share-private-data-with-brands-infographic/.
Figure 12.
From Pew Research Center. “Americans’ Views on Open Government Data.”  (2015) http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/21/open-
government-data/.
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state or federal government.110 Trust in government was critical in driving support for open data, 
however: individuals with more trust in government also had far greater belief in the benefits of 
open data.
A pronounced public engagement strategy thus appears critical for cities wishing to re-establish a 
positive narrative about government data. Indeed, a study of consumer-corporate relationships in the 
UK shows that the two most important factors determining the public’s willingness to share data with 
certain brands is the perceived trustworthiness of the brand and whether it has a clear privacy policy. 111 
Cities are now also in a position to establish a data stewardship relationship with their constituents, and 
should consider how best to communicate their commitment to security, privacy, and data integrity. 
The Pew surveys also provide insights regarding what information the public is comfortable being 
shared. Over 80% of respondents are comfortable with the government sharing health and safety 
data on restaurants, but only 22% are comfortable with online disclosure of individual homeowner 
mortgages.112  This suggests that citizens’ privacy concerns are manifested most acutely when it comes 
to open data about individuals. 
112Pew Research Center, “Americans’ Views on Open Government Data.”
113 Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life (Stanford University Press, 2009); “A Contextual 
Approach to Privacy Online,” Daedalus 140, no. 4 (2011).
114 Kirsten E. Martin and Helen Nissenbaum, “Measuring Privacy: An Empirical Test Using Context To Expose Confounding Variables,” 
Columbia Science and Technology Law Review (forthcoming)  (2016).
115 Helen Nissenbaum, “Privacy as Contextual Integrity,” Washington Law Review 79, no. 1 (2004).
Figure 13.
From Pew Research Center. “Americans’ Views on Open Government Data.”  (2015) http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/21/open-
government-data/.
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Figure 14.
Figure 15.
From Pew Research Center. “Americans’ Views on Open Government Data.”  (2015) http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/21/open-
government-data/.
From Pew Research Center. “Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in the Post-Snowden Era.”  (2014) http://www.pewinternet.
org/2014/11/12/public-privacy-perceptions/.
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For additional insights regarding public comfort with data releases, data stewards can turn to the 
work of Helen Nissenbaum for an analysis of privacy concerns in social contexts.113 Nissenbaum 
emphasizes how social norms drive our expectations about what information should be available, 
and who has access to that information.114 As a recent report explains, “People care about and 
value privacy – privacy defined as respecting the appropriate norms of information flow for a given 
context […] privacy expectations [are] highly dependent on the contextual factors—such as actors 
receiving the information as well as uses of information. In fact, how the information is used is more 
important to meeting/violating privacy expectations than the type and sensitivity level of given 
information.”  When data is used for purposes beyond the reason it was originally collected, people 
are concerned because the social context of that data has changed. Nissenbaum’s approach also 
explores the limitations of traditional “notice and consent” models, showing that citizens often do not 
understand the implications of data release disclosures or privacy policies. According to Nissenbaum, 
transparency as to the fact that data will be released is not enough. Instead, citizens desire and should 
be empowered with “the right to control information about oneself.”115  When city open-data initiatives 
release information that might implicate individuals (such taxi records or location data about crimes), 
they may violate constituent expectations about control over personal data trails.
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TAKE ACTION 
When preparing to release public data that may affect citizen privacy, cities should begin with an understanding of public opinion: 
awareness of these opinions can guide data processing decisions; prompt informed engagement with citizens before, during, and after 
release; and improve the means by which released data are branded and communicated to the public. Furthermore, when navigating the 
ambiguity of what data qualifies as sensitive, cities should incorporate traditional models of privacy preservation (i.e., avoid releasing directly 
personally-identifiable information) as well as more context-specific social norms that shape public expectations about data. 
The three-step process below can help cities manage these tricky issues and determine how best to 
factor public perceptions into their decisions of when and how to release data.
LOW: The public has not 
expressed any interest in 
this data or related data.
MEDIUM: The public has 
expressed mild interest in 
this data or related data.
HIGH: The public has  
expressed high interest in 
this data or related data.
LOW: There are no clear 
benefits to releasing this 
data
Low benefit
MEDIUM: There are mild 
benefits to releasing this 
data  
Medium benefit
HIGH: There are significant 
benefits to releasing this 
data.
High benefit
1. Determine benefits
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Public support for releasing data (public records requests, etc.)
LOW: The data reveals 
information that is typically 
made public.
MEDIUM: The data  
might reveal mildly sensitive  
information that some  
members of the public 
would not expect to be 
made available.
HIGH: The data reveals 
sensitive information that 
the public would not  
expect to be made  
available.
LOW: Re-identification is 
not likely, nor would it  
generate any harm for 
those affected.
Low risk
MEDIUM: Re-identification 
is somewhat likely to occur, 
and could generate moderate 
harm for those affected.
Medium risk
HIGH: Re-identification is 
likely to occur, and could 
generate significant harm 
for those affected.
High risk
2. Determine risks Social norms violations of releasing data (i.e., public expectation of privacy)
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LOW MEDIUM HIGH
LOW Release data
MEDIUM Possibly release  
data; weigh the 
case-specific risks  
and benefits
HIGH Do not release data
3. Balance benefits and risks Benefit
R
is
k
IN PRACTICE
InBloom was an education data mining company whose mission was to gather data from schools so 
that it could study student academic performance and develop individualized curricula. The company 
quickly raised $100 million in seed funding after being founded in 2011 and partnered with multiple 
states. Despite the potential value of this data to improve help schools and teachers, however, 
InBloom faced organized pushback from groups of parents who were concerned about how their 
children’s data would be used. Parents were wary that the data would not be properly protected from 
hackers or that it would be sold to data brokers. 
Rather than demonstrating to the public that it took these concerns seriously and working to 
build public trust, “InBloom and the New York State Education Department were arrogant [...] and 
insensitive to parents who were concerned about their children’s data being collected,” according to 
the NYCLU.116  Despite repeated requests, the company did not let parents opt their children out of 
the program, instead dismissing all of their fears as misconceptions
Ultimately, these concerns and issues led to the dissolution of InBloom. By the time InBloom announced 
in 2014 that it would shut down, six of its nine state partners had backed out of relationships with the 
company.
The downfall of InBloom due to privacy concerns proves the importance of having an effectively 
communicated privacy program. Because it did not properly consider or respond to public 
expectations, InBloom faced a significant backlash that ultimately prevented it from achieving its 
goals. While InBloom felt that the demands for greater privacy would have hindered its progress, in 
fact a more responsible approach to privacy would have enabled innovation, not prevented it entirely.
This story also highlights other important lessons for data stewards, including:
•   People desire agency over how data about them is used. InBloom exacerbated tensions by not 
allowing privacy-concerned parents to opt their children out of the program. 
•   Data about certain populations is particularly sensitive. While it is common practice for Internet 
companies to mine user data and share it with third parties, parents are particularly sensitive 
about privacy when it comes to their children. Treating student data the same as other information 
generated significant pushback. 
•   When data is used for purposes unrelated to the reasons it was collected, people from whom 
that data was gathered may feel exploited. A 2014 White House report on Big Data states, “As 
students begin to share information with educational institutions, they expect that they are doing 
so in order to develop knowledge and skills, not to have their data used to build extensive profiles 
about their strengths and weaknesses that could be used to their disadvantage in later years.”  
116 Ariel Bogle, “What the Failure of inBloom Means for the Student-Data Industry,” Slate, April 24, 2014. http://www.slate.com/blogs/
future_tense/2014/04/24/what_the_failure_of_inbloom_means_for_the_student_data_industry.html.
117 Executive Office of the President. “Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values.”  (2014) https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf.
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Citizens want agency, control, and transparency as to how their data is collected, and how it is 
used. A May 2015 Pew Research Center study about Americans’ views on data collection shows 
that 93% of adults value “being in control of who can get information about them.”118  Additionally, 
90% care about controlling the content of what is collected about them. 
Meanwhile, citizens also have high demand for certain information. Data for tracking sex-
offenders119 and city budgets120 are of constant interest, and the public is particularly concerned 
when such data is even temporarily withdrawn or obfuscated. Citizens also care about health and 
safety information about natural resources, restaurants, hospitals, and other city-regulated public 
spaces.121,122 Providing open data about these topics will garner public support for open data. Cities 
are less likely to receive pushback about releasing sensitive information when the data itself is 
highly sought after or can clearly contribute to broadly desired goals (e.g., improving public safety).
Transparency and responsiveness are critical to building public support  
and achieving the aims of open data. Incorporating public desires into open  
data decisions will help ensure that the public understands and supports  
the program.
BAKE PUBLIC INPUT INTO ALL ASPECTS 
OF THE OPEN DATA PROGRAM.
4.3
118 Pew Research Center. “Americans’ Views About Data Collection and Security.”  (2015) http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/05/20/
americans-views-about-data-collection-and-security/.
119 Milton J. Valencia, “State begins review of 500 sex offender cases,” The Boston Globe, February 25, 2016.  
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/02/24/new-hearings-for-sex-offenders-begin-this-week-could-take-years-complete/
dfp465dWInMKZDGdVRUPnJ/story.html.
120 Pamela Martineau, “Open Data Evolution: From Increasing Transparency to Engaging Citizens,” Government Technology, March 10, 
2015. http://www.govtech.com/data/Open-Data-Evolution-From-Increasing-Transparency-to-Engaging-Citizens.html.
121 Anna Maria Barry-Jester, “What Went Wrong In Flint,” FiveThirtyEight, January 26, 2016. 
http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-went-wrong-in-flint-water-crisis-michigan/.
122Pew Research Center, “Americans’ Views on Open Government Data.”
TAKE ACTION 
There are multiple steps that cities can take to incorporate public input into their open data decisions:
•   Form privacy committees with members of the public. These groups allow members of the 
public to have a direct voice in how open data programs approach privacy and ensure that public 
concerns are accounted for when making open data decisions. These groups should draw upon 
Institutional Review Boards (IRBs, committees that oversee human subject studies to ensure they 
are conducted legally and ethically) to develop structures and responsibilities for how to monitor 
data collection and sharing practices.
•   Incorporate public responses on what data is released. This will help ensure that open data 
programs are responsive to and build value for the public.
•   Provide tools for public feedback on open data portals. These could include requests for new data 
and public comments with questions or concerns about particular datasets.
•   Be responsive to public concerns when they arise. Addressing issues openly and honestly will 
enable a dialogue that will help both sides understand one another’s perspective and goals.
Following these strategies will help cities explain future decisions regarding how data is released. 
Even if re-identification occurs, cities can respond by noting that their data release process was 
based on priorities that were developed in collaboration with the public.
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Figure 16. Seattle dataset suggestion form
Screenshot from https://data.seattle.gov/nominate. 
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IN PRACTICE
In 2014, Seattle convened a Privacy Advisory Committee consisting of local technologists, lawyers, 
and community representatives that was charged with developing principles that could inform the 
City’s privacy policies.  This committee created the City’s Privacy Principles and helped structure 
its broader approach to privacy. Seattle’s extensive privacy guidelines,  which reflect the priorities 
of the public, are now among the most thorough in the country.
Similar to Seattle, Chicago has convened a privacy committee that is responsible for overseeing 
its Array of Things project.  The project website states,
“ Operating as an external, independent review team, the committee will also be consulted 
whenever there is a request for a new kind of data to be collected. [...] No data will be 
monitored without the approval of the privacy and security external oversight committee.” 
The Array of Things has also pursued other proactive forms of public engagement and in August 2015 
released an extensive report detailing all of the ways it had engaged the City’s community about the 
project.  This document describes the steps taken to engage residents, summarizes the public feedback 
received, and outlines lessons learned for future efforts. Resident feedback showed a desire for greater 
clarity and more thorough policies related to the people and groups involved, data collection and 
sharing, and public notice. Meanwhile, the report highlights lessons learned, including “to undergo a 
wider awareness campaign to inform residents of the who, what, where, when, and why of the project 
before asking residents to react to that project” and stressed that it is “important to communicate what 
the sensors can’t do” (in response to public concerns about potential privacy violations).
This report makes it clear that those responsible for the Array of Things pursued a high level of public 
feedback and that they built this input into both their policies as well as their plans for engaging the 
public even more effectively moving forward.
123 Privacy Advisory Committee, City of Seattle http://www.seattle.gov/tech/initiatives/privacy/privacy-advisory-committee 
124Privacy, City of Seattle http://www.seattle.gov/tech/initiatives/privacy 
125Array of Things, “Array of Things,”  https://arrayofthings.github.io.
126Ibid.
127”Array of Things Civic Engagement Report,”  https://arrayofthings.github.io/engagement-report.html.
BE TRANSPARENT AND ACCOUNTABLE 
REGARDING ALL PRACTICES RELATED 
TO OPEN DATA.
4.4
Releasing data is a means toward transparency and accountability, not the 
end. Achieving transparency and accountability requires thoroughly baking 
these aims into all aspects of the open data program and carefully docu-
menting those practices.
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Open data initiatives are driven by a desire to increase government transparency and accountability. 
While opening internal data contributes to these aims, it is possible for the process through which 
data is released to have negative impacts on transparency and accountability.
This is particularly true with regard to privacy. As described in previous sections within this Chapter, 
most people are nervous about their individual privacy and have low levels of trust in government. 
This places open data programs in a precarious position: they must release data, but also must 
be careful not to violate public desires related to privacy or government use of data. Because 
releasing datasets involves complex questions without a clear answer, open data practices will 
elicit varied responses from the public. In particular, any actions that cause negative consequences 
for individual privacy will likely cause the public to become less trusting of government — even 
if releasing the data makes government more open. By transparently sharing their practices 
and holding themselves accountable for the effects of their decisions, open data programs can 
mitigate some of these trust issues.
The best way to ensure that open data programs contribute to transparency and accountability 
is to bake these goals into every practice and evaluate impact based on contributions to these 
aims. Instead of viewing the complex challenges associated with open data as roadblocks hindering 
their progress, open data leaders should embrace them as opportunities for collaborative decision-
making with constituents. What better area to pioneer open government decision-making than a 
program already designed precisely for that purpose?
TAKE ACTION 
Cities can take the following steps to ensure that all of their data practices are transparent. Underlying the following recommendations are 
explanations: do not just say what was done, but also explain why. Ensure that all descriptions are accessible to non-experts. The public 
may not agree with every decision, but by sharing how decisions were reached open data leaders will encourage informed deliberation 
rather than knee-jerk controversy.
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TITLE DESCRIPTION
Data collection •   Communicate when and where data is being collected, from what sources, and how it may be dis-
closed in the future.
•   Clarify how data will be used and for how long it will be stored. Equally important can be clarifying 
how data will not be used. Public concerns about data are often foreseeable, and in most cases cities 
have no intentions of taking those actions. Cities can stem the tide of backlash by clearly stating the 
problematic ways in which data will not be leveraged.
Data release •   Disclose contextual details about data releases so that the public understands the risks and benefits. 
This includes information about what the data represents and how it was generated, as well as more 
data-level information such as the accuracy and precision of the information.
•   Explain what actions to protect privacy were considered and taken when releasing data, and the basis 
for making those decisions. 
•   Be transparent about de-identification methods. If published data has been altered from its original 
form, be sure to report how and why. Otherwise, the public may misinterpret the information provided 
or draw faulty conclusions.
Responses to public •   Be upfront about responsibility if privacy issues arise. Explain the assumptions and decisions that went 
into a particular data release, and why those may or may not have been misguided. This, of course, 
requires having a privacy evaluation process that can be confidently described and defended.
128 Digital Chicago, “Chicago Taxi Data Released,”  http://digital.cityofchicago.org/index.php/chicago-taxi-data-released/.
129Array of Things, “Array of Things Civic Engagement Report”.
130“Responses to public feedback,”  https://arrayofthings.github.io/policy-responses.html.
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IN PRACTICE
Two stories from the City of Chicago highlight best practices for how cities can be transparent and 
accountable when sharing open data. In November 2016, when the City released data about more 
than 100 million taxi trips spanning a period of three years, it also published a post describing the 
data.128  Included in this report was a thorough discussion of how the data had been altered to protect 
privacy and improve quality. Not only did Chicago take steps to protect individual privacy in this new 
dataset (such as delaying publication and masking locations), it also shared how it had done this so 
that users would understand the city’s privacy processes and the data itself. This step should become 
common practice among cities, especially for datasets that are complex and involve information 
about individuals.
The City of Chicago was also particularly open and responsive while developing the policies for its 
Array of Things.129  As a first step, the City published draft policies and invited the public to provide 
comments and feedback. Beyond incorporating the public comments into the final policies, the Array 
of Things also released a document responding specifically to every comment.130 Questions and 
responses considered topics such as the location of sensors, the partners involved, potential privacy 
risks and mitigations, and future plans.
The following shows an example of the questions and responses related to privacy:
QUESTION ANSWER
This is a concerning piece of wording and implementation of 
this proposal. This makes me have to ask about the specific 
management rules of these images - who has access, how long 
will they be stored, and how do they get deleted? If these 
images are never deleted, then the entire PII section of this 
document is void from a technical perspective. With enough 
images taken over time, one can find an individual based  
on their clothing, follow them through each image, and  
eventually determine where they work and where they live. 
From there, it’s pretty easy to figure out the rest of that 
person’s identity. Blurring out images and license plates is not 
enough. To me, I think it would be better if a smarter solution 
could be implemented to where images are not even needed 
for these metrics (i.e. traffic patterns). I don’t know what that 
solution would be, but I’m more afraid of the potential of 
future harm to be done with these images more than anything.
The policy document has been updated to clarify that image  
processing for the street-facing cameras will be done on the  
nodes themselves, and the images will then be deleted - not saved 
or transmitted. For calibration of image processing software, a 
fraction of 1% of images will be randomly saved. This limited set of 
images will contain no sensitive PII. Some may potentially show faces 
or license plates, and while these are not considered sensitive PII 
the project has elected nonetheless to limit access to those images 
to approved individuals who have signed usage agreements, as 
outlined in the published privacy policy document.
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QUESTION ANSWER
I think information sharing should be limited carefully. No 
data should be downloaded to individual personal devices. 
This sounds a lot like big brother. If the data is there  
somebody will access and use it.
No data with any information about an individual will be published. 
All data management and access within the project team is governed 
by signed ethics and privacy agreements. These agreements include 
restrictions on where the data may be processed, including prohibi-
tion from storing on personal devices of any kind.
It is the following section which causes me the most concern: 
“The Array of Things technology is designed and operated 
to protect privacy. PII data, such as could be found in images 
or sounds, will not be made public. For the purposes of 
instrument calibration, testing, and software enhancement, 
images and audio files that may contain PII will be periodical-
ly processed to improve, develop, and enhance algorithms 
that could detect and report on conditions such as street 
flooding, car/bicycle traffic, storm conditions, or poor visibil-
ity. Raw calibration data that could contain PII will be stored 
in a secure facility for processing during the course of the 
Array of Things project, including for purposes of improving 
the technology to protect PII. Access to this limited volume 
of data is restricted to operator employees, contractors and 
approved scientific partners who need to process the data 
for instrument design and calibration purposes, and who are 
subject to strict contractual confidentiality obligations and 
will be subject to discipline and/or termination if they fail to 
meet these obligations.” Of course the question becomes 
how does the public verify precisely who has such access to 
the PII data? Will access parameters be modified over time? 
Specifically, what assurances can one gain that the Chicago 
Police Department, NSA, or other agencies will not have 
access to this data?
The documents have been clarified to differentiate between 
“non-sensitive PII” such as can be found in the public domain, and 
“sensitive PII,” which can identify an individual. The Array of Things 
has no capability to access or detect sensitive PII, but can detect 
visual features that are considered to be “non-sensitive PII” such as 
faces in the public way or license plate numbers.
Although not sensitive PII, the privacy and governance policies nev-
ertheless limit who will have access to data, under what circumstanc-
es, and for the limited purpose of research and development. The 
policies also outline how even this potential non-sensitive PII will be 
controlled, audited, and protected. One important role of the inde-
pendent external team (Technical Security and Privacy Group, Section 
3.4 of the governance policy document) is to audit the project with 
respect to compliance to these policies.
By publicly responding to all of these questions, those responsible for the Array of Things demonstrated 
that they recognize that their success relies on more than just the sensors themselves: it is critical that 
the public support the program and have a voice in its development. The program’s transparency in 
thoughtfully addressing public feedback plays a crucial role in ensuring that the Array of Things truly 
benefits all Chicagoans.
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Many new smart cities initiatives have great promise but require new forms of data collection. 
Given low levels of trust in government (see Section 4.2), some members of the public will 
understandably be wary of new forms of government surveillance. Rolling out programs without 
public discussion is likely to compound these constituents’ concern and suspicion. On the other 
hand, other residents will see the benefit of these programs and be less concerned about privacy. 
Proactive engagement strategies can harness the energy of excited constituents while mitigating 
the concerns of skeptics.
The benefits from sensors and other forms of cutting-edge data collection 
will be possible only with public support. Implementing successful initiatives 
requires proactive engagement to educate constituents and address issues 
before they arise.
BUILD SUPPORT FOR NEW INITIATIVES 
BEFORE ROLLING THEM OUT.
4.5
88
TAKE ACTION 
It is critical to advertise upfront the value of data collection and open data with the public. The following process can help cities that are 
considering new data-driven initiatives.
PROCESS DESCRIPTION
Develop a preliminary  
privacy policy. Consider the issues 
described in Section 2.1  
to generate this plan, and include 
the following questions.
•   What data will be collected? 
•   How will the data be used? 
•   Which of these uses are likely to be supported by the public, and which will be opposed?  
Reduce or eliminate uses that are likely to elicit strong public opposition.
•   Is all of the data being collected critical to enable the desired uses? Limit collection to only those  
features necessary for the planned applications.
Publicize planned efforts along with 
the preliminary privacy policy. 
•   Make it clear what data will be collected and how that data will be used. 
•   Emphasize the social benefits of these uses.
•   Reduce redundancy by combining datasets related to the same topic. If releasing multiple  
related datasets, format them as consistently as possible (e.g., same column names) to make 
them easy to work with.
Engage the public by asking for 
input regarding this privacy policy, 
with a particular emphasis on deter-
mining what data they want collect-
ed and what uses they support.
•   If there are skeptics opposed to data collection, try to understand why they oppose these efforts. 
There may be particular uses that skeptics fear; by developing the privacy policy to prevent these 
uses, it may be possible to gain their support.
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IN PRACTICE
In November 2013, backed by $2.7 million from the Department of Homeland Security, the City 
of Seattle installed sensors designed to form a mesh network that would help law enforcement 
communicate during emergencies. The City did not provide the public with any details of the 
technology or its uses, and when residents noticed the devices they became concerned about 
the surveillance capabilities of this technology. Local newspaper The Stranger published an article 
explaining that these sensors could detect every wireless device nearby and track someone’s 
movements throughout the city.  The story also quoted a Seattle Police Department detective 
saying that he “is not comfortable answering policy questions when we do not yet have a policy.” 
This further inflamed the public response since it appeared that the City was being cavalier about 
individual privacy and not taking the necessary precautions to protect against surveillance.
The Seattle Police Department responded to this controversy the following week by announcing 
that it would deactivate the mesh network, stating “The wireless mesh network will be deactivated 
until city council approves a draft policy and until there’s an opportunity for vigorous public 
debate.”  Aruba Networks, the company that developed the technology, publicly addressed the 
situation, explaining, “the mesh product is not capable of reporting on unassociated devices.” 
The City also released a letter from Aruba explaining how the sensor technology does not track 
unassociated devices nor will it add this capability in the future. Nonetheless, the public remained 
suspicious about the potential for surveillance and the program was never reactivated.
This story highlights how a lack of transparency and clarity regarding privacy policies can lead to 
pushback from concerned residents. Because the City was not proactive in engaging the public 
about the value of this technology and the steps being taken to protect individual privacy, the 
worst fears of some residents drove an amplified public conversation. Even when it turned out that 
the technology could not track individuals as many feared, it was too late to garner support for the 
program. This negative public response ultimately prevented the Seattle Police Department from 
activating and using the mesh networking system.
This cautionary tale also highlights how to effectively respond to miscues in order to prevent them 
from occurring again. In addition to managing the fallout from this incident, Seattle also considered 
how it could better develop policies and practices to protect privacy in the future. In response, 
Seattle convened their Privacy Program (see Section 3.1) and Privacy Advisory Committee (see 
Section 4.3), both of which have made substantial positive impacts on Seattle’s ability to build 
effective privacy management into their technology initiatives.
131 Brendan Kiley and Matt Fikse-Verkerk, “You Are a Rogue Device,” The Stranger, November 6, 2013. http://www.thestranger.com/seattle/
you-are-a-rogue-device/Content?oid=18143845.
132Ibid.
133 “The Seattle Police Department Disables Its Mesh Network (the New Apparatus Capable of Spying on You),” The Stranger, November 
12, 2013. http://www.thestranger.com/slog/archives/2013/11/12/the-seattle-police-department-disables-its-mesh-network-the-new-
apparatus-capable-of-spying-on-you.
134Ibid.
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As cities across the country release more open data every day, it becomes increasingly important 
that they protect the privacy of individuals represented in the data. The privacy risks of open data 
are diverse, arising from many different types of data. Meanwhile, recent research and events 
have shown the limits of traditional approaches for protecting privacy that rely on removing a 
small set of direct identifiers. This report responds to these developments and lays out an array of 
approaches for cities to protect privacy that span technology, policy, and civic engagement. 
Cities should:
 1. Conduct risk-benefit analyses to inform the design of open data programs. 
 2. Consider privacy at each stage of the data lifecycle. 
 3.  Develop operational structures and processes that codify privacy management 
throughout the open data program. 
 4.  Emphasize public engagement and public priorities as essential aspects of open data 
programs.
Achieving these goals will require municipalities to incorporate privacy protection as a key goal 
of its initiatives related to data. Ultimately, cities must embrace their role as stewards of individual 
data, recognizing that protecting the individuals represented in data is a key responsibility of 
becoming data-driven.
While this report lays out many key guidelines to manage privacy in open data, further efforts are 
required to ensure cities have the capacity and tools required for effective data stewardship. Most 
critically, data scientists and cities must work together to develop specific technical guidelines for 
how to prepare datasets for release. Given that cities release similar datasets, it may be possible to 
develop standard approaches for how certain types of information should be managed. Although 
computer scientists are still developing our understanding of the bounds of data privacy, cities will 
benefit from explicit instructions for mitigating privacy risks that balance benefit and risk based 
on our current knowledge of effective approaches. As this report has shown, however, data-level 
approaches are necessary but not sufficient. Cities must continue to develop operational structures 
and processes that codify privacy management, and share lessons learned about how to create 
a strong culture of data stewardship. Of particular importance is the need for cities to develop 
communications and feedback strategies for public engagement about data privacy. Privacy 
risks in open data are in many cases matters of public perception, and arise when individuals feel 
uncomfortable with the types of data being collected or released. Data privacy decisions made in 
a vacuum will be unsuccessful.
As municipal open data initiatives (and other data-driven programs) grow in scale and complexity, 
so too must their accompanying data governance. Through the approaches described in this 
report coupled with best practices that develop as more cities and data scientists take action, it 
will be possible to achieve new gains through data while also protecting individual privacy.
CONCLUSION
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This Appendix synthesizes key elements of the report into an Open Data Privacy Toolkit that cities 
can use to manage privacy when sharing and releasing data. It contains:
•  Summary of recommendations (Executive Summary)
•  Background on open data privacy risks and vulnerabilities (Section 1.2)
•  Background on open data privacy risk mitigations (Section 1.3)
•  Risk-benefit analysis form (Sections 1.1, 1.2, 1.3)
•  Open data release checklist (Section 2.3)
•  Public perceptions management form (Section 4.2)
APPENDIX. OPEN DATA PRIVACY TOOLKIT 
Conduct risk-benefit analyses to inform the design and implementation of open data programs.
•  Determine the desired benefits of releasing each element of open data.
•   Recognize the limits of de-identification techniques and evaluate the privacy risks of 
releasing data.
•   Consider a diversity of potential mitigations and choose the one best calibrated to the specific 
risks and benefits of the data.
Consider privacy at each stage of the data lifecycle.
•  Collect: Be mindful of privacy before collecting any data.
•  Maintain: Keep track of privacy risks in all data stored and maintained.
•  Release: Evaluate datasets for privacy risks and mitigate those risks before releasing data.
•   Delete: Where appropriate, retire data stored internally, turn off automatic collection, and remove data 
shared online to mitigate privacy risks that result from the accumulation of data.
Develop operational structures and processes that codify privacy management throughout 
the open data program.
•  Increase internal awareness of and attention to privacy risks.
•  Periodically audit data and processes to ensure privacy standards continue to be upheld.
•  Account for the unique risks and opportunities presented by public records laws.
•  Develop a portfolio of approaches for releasing and sharing data.
Emphasize public engagement and public priorities as essential aspects of open data programs.
•  Garner support for open data by sharing the benefits and successful uses of open data.
•   Develop constituency trust by considering public expectations and acting as responsible 
data stewards.
•  Bake public input into all aspects of the open data program.
•  Be transparent and accountable regarding all practices related to open data.
•  Build support for new initiatives before rolling them out.
OPEN DATA PRIVACY  
RECOMMENDATIONS
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THREAT EVENT DESCRIPTION RISK DESCRIPTION EXAMPLE
Re-identifica-
tion
Re-identification 
occurs when individual 
identities are inferred 
from data that has 
been de-identified 
(i.e., altered to remove 
individual identity from 
the data), and new 
information about those 
re-identified identities 
becomes known.
Re-identification involves the 
ability to learn information 
about individuals that would 
not otherwise be known. In 
many cases this new informa-
tion can lead to a variety of 
harms for the re-identified in-
dividuals such as embarrass-
ment, shame, identity theft, 
discrimination, and targeting 
for crime.
In 2000, Latanya Sweeney showed how de-iden-
tified health records could be combined with 
voting registration records to re-identify the 
health records of most individuals in the US. 
This meant that it was possible to identify the 
individual referenced in many health records 
that were released under the assumption of 
anonymity. Scientific American describes a 
notable example: “William Weld, then the 
[Massachusetts] governor, assured the public 
that identifying individual patients in the records 
would be impossible. Within days, an envelope 
from a graduate student at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology arrived at Weld’s office. It 
contained the governor’s health records.”
False  
re-identification
When data is partially 
anonymous, individuals 
are at risk of having 
sensitive facts incorrect-
ly connected to them 
through flawed re-iden-
tification techniques. 
This is especially likely 
to occur when open 
data is of low quality, 
and contains incorrect 
information or is difficult 
to interpret.
Failed re-identification can 
be as troubling as successful 
re-identification. Individ-
uals might have incorrect 
inferences made about them, 
which could lead to the 
same harms listed above for 
re-identification. These harms 
might be even more severe 
for false re-identification, 
since the outcomes will be 
based on false information or 
assumptions.
A release of data pertaining to 2013 taxi trips in 
New York City allowed journalists to determine 
where celebrities who had been photographed 
getting in or out of taxis were going to and 
coming from, along with the fare and tip paid. 
Surprisingly, many of these trips contained no 
recorded tip, leading to reports that certain ce-
lebrities were stingy and, in response, defenses 
from these celebrities’ agents. Further analysis 
of the data revealed that many trips simply have 
no recorded tip, suggesting that the assumption 
that some celebrities paid no tip was in fact 
incorrect and due to issues with data quality.
Profile-building Many companies and 
other groups compile 
information about 
individuals to build a 
digital profile of each 
person’s demographics, 
characteristics, habits, 
and preferences. Open 
data might contribute 
new information to 
these profiles.
Profiles built on data about 
individuals can be used to 
analyze and target informa-
tion to specific segments of 
the population, thus facilitat-
ing algorithmic discrimination 
and exclusionary marketing.
It has become common practice for compa-
nies to target ads to users based on individual 
preferences, and, in some cases, treat customers 
differently based on profiles developed by com-
piling data about those individuals. Bloomberg 
calls this practice “Weblining, an Information 
Age version of that nasty old practice of redlin-
ing, where lenders and other businesses mark 
whole neighborhoods off-limits. Cyberspace 
doesn’t have any real geography, but that’s no 
impediment to Weblining. At its most benign, 
the practice could limit your choices in products 
or services, or force you to pay top dollar. In a 
more pernicious guise, Weblining may perma-
nently close doors to you or your business.” 
Open data can contribute new information that 
feeds online profiles and allows for potential 
discrimination.
OPEN DATA PRIVACY RISKS
Green, Ben, Gabe Cunningham, Ariel Ekblaw, Paul Kominers, Andrew Linzer, and Susan Crawford. Open Data Privacy (2017). Berkman 
Klein Center Research Publication. Available at DASH: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:30340010.
THREAT EVENT DESCRIPTION RISK DESCRIPTION EXAMPLE
Online  
discoverability
Information that is 
available online and ac-
cessible from an online 
search.
When information in open 
data appears in online search 
results, it appears to a wide 
audience who might not 
otherwise have sought out 
that information. This is a sig-
nificant change from the past, 
in which government records 
were typically available only 
to those who visited city hall 
to access them. Many citizens 
will be concerned when open 
data associated with their 
identity can be discovered 
through online searches for 
their name or address. Even 
if people are comfortable 
with the data being released 
on an open data portal, they 
might assume that the data is 
accessible only to those who 
seek it out. Exposing infor-
mation in open data to online 
search engines can violate 
this assumption.
Multiple websites today post arrest records, 
including mug shots, to the Internet. While this 
information is public record, traditionally one 
would have needed to go to a courthouse to 
obtain it. Now one can find this information, 
even inadvertently, just by searching the name 
of someone who is listed by mug shot websites. 
This is especially damaging, New York Times 
writes, because “Mug shots are merely artifacts 
of an arrest, not proof of a conviction, and many 
people whose images are now on display were 
never found guilty, or the charges against them 
were dropped. But these pictures can cause 
serious reputational damage.” The Times cites 
examples such as an individual who was denied 
a job due to online mug shots that appeared 
when a potential employer searched his name. 
These sites typically require fees up to several 
hundred dollars to have a mug shot removed, a 
practice that many have called extortion.
Public backlash Whenever sensitive 
information is pub-
lished as open data, 
the public is likely to 
respond by blaming the 
government entity that 
released the data and 
losing faith in that entity 
to act as responsible 
data stewards.
Public disapproval of open 
data releases may result 
from one of the outcomes 
described above and suggest 
that the city is not acting 
with the best interests of its 
residents in mind. Further-
more, public disapproval 
detracts from the viability of 
an open data program. With-
out public trust in a city to 
responsibly share data, open 
data programs will struggle 
to gain necessary support for 
releasing data. More broadly, 
backlashes due to sensitive 
data releases undermine the 
public’s trust in government.
In June 2016, Washington, DC published online 
the City’s full voter list, which includes names, 
addresses, and political affiliations. Many people 
responded with shock and outrage that DC 
would publish this information in such a widely 
available format, tweeting with hashtags like 
“#open_data_fail” and calling the event “hor-
rific.” While a public records law mandated that 
DC release this information, the event nonethe-
less made many individuals lose faith in DC as a 
responsible steward of their information.
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VULNERABILITY DATA DESCRIPTION RISK DESCRIPTION EXAMPLE
Direct  
identifiers
Features within a dataset 
that, on their own, iden-
tify individuals. These 
features (such as name, 
address, and Social 
Security Number) have 
traditionally been known 
as personally identifiable 
information (PII).
Because direct identifiers implicate an 
individual, all of the data tied to that 
identifier can be connected to the 
individual in question.
One dataset commonly released 
by open data programs is property 
assessments. Because this information 
includes each property’s owner and ad-
dress (direct identifiers), most records 
can be connected to an individual. Any 
information attached to these records 
(such as property value, renovation his-
tory, and violations) can therefore also 
be traced back to an individual.
Quasi  
(a.k.a. indirect) 
identifiers
Features within a dataset 
that, in combination 
with other data, identify 
individuals. The ability 
to link features across 
datasets and learn about 
individuals is known as 
the mosaic effect.
Seemingly innocuous data can be-
come revealing when combined with 
other datasets. Because quasi identi-
fiers provide some information about 
individuals (although not enough by 
themselves to identify someone), they 
often facilitate linkage attacks (using 
the mosaic effect) that combine auxilia-
ry information with quasi identifiers to 
identify individuals.
In a 2000 study, Latanya Sweeney 
showed how de-identified health re-
cords (containing the quasi identifiers 
birthdate, gender, and zip code about 
every individual) could be combined 
with voting registration records (which 
contain direct identifiers such as names 
along with the quasi identifiers men-
tioned above) to re-identify the health 
records of most individuals in the US.
Metadata  
(e.g., behavior-
al records)
As The National 
Information Standards 
Organization describes, 
“Metadata is structured 
information that de-
scribes, explains, locates, 
or otherwise makes it 
easier to retrieve, use, or 
manage an information 
resource. Metadata is 
often called data about 
data or information 
about information.” In 
a database of emails, 
for example, metadata 
contains the sender, 
recipient, and timestamp 
of emails. While email 
metadata does not 
contain the contents of 
emails, it can reveal pat-
terns about how people 
correspond. As such, 
metadata often compris-
es behavioral records.
While metadata has not traditionally 
been seen as sensitive, the President’s 
Council of Advisors on Science and 
Technology (PCAST) writes, “There is 
no reason to believe that metadata 
raise fewer privacy concerns than the 
data they describe.” Although indi-
vidual metadata records may appear 
anonymous, large sets of metadata 
describe detailed and unique patterns 
of behavior that make it possible to 
identify individuals and learn intimate 
details about those people. Behav-
iors of individuals can be discovered 
based on auxiliary knowledge (such as 
paparazzi photographs) or analyzing 
trends in the data (such as regular 
appearances at specific addresses). 
Furthermore, the privacy risks related 
to metadata are particularly troubling 
because such data can reveal intimate 
details of a person’s life that would 
never otherwise be known and that 
the re-identified individual may never 
expect to be accessible.
Metadata is particularly sensitive when 
it is longitudinal, i.e., when multiple 
records of the same individual can 
be connected. In a 2015 study of 
de-identified credit card metadata, 
computer scientists showed that many 
people could be uniquely re-identified 
from records indicating the times and 
locations of each person’s purchases. 
Because people’s movements and 
spending habits are idiosyncratic 
and unique, even a small number of 
records from one person are unlikely to 
be replicated by anyone else. In partic-
ular, the authors found that “knowing 
four random spatiotemporal points or 
tuples is enough to uniquely reidentify 
90% of the individuals and to uncover 
all of their records.” Another study 
found that it was possible to predict 
people’s personalities based on their 
mobile phone metadata.
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VULNERABILITY DATA DESCRIPTION RISK DESCRIPTION EXAMPLE
Addresses Street addresses or 
location names.
Location data is often highly identifi-
able and can reveal particularly sensi-
tive details about individuals. Because 
addresses identify where someone 
lives or where an event occurred, they 
are a rich source of information that 
make it easy to re-identify or learn 
intimate information about someone. 
Locations are also easy to link across 
datasets, facilitating the mosaic effect.
Many cities publish data about 311 
requests, which relate to topics such 
as street and sidewalk repairs, missed 
trash pickups, animal waste, and pest 
complaints. Because a typical entry in 
a 311 dataset includes the address for 
which the request is made along with a 
description of the issue, many requests 
can be re-identified to determine the 
requester and information about that 
person’s life.
Geographic 
coordinates
Coordinates that identify 
a unique location on a 
map (i.e., latitude and 
longitude).
Geographic coordinates present the 
same vulnerabilities as addresses since 
they translate into locations. Because 
geographic coordinates do not by 
themselves reveal a location, however, 
they may appear to be less sensitive 
than the addresses they represent. 
This is misleading, as it is simple to 
obtain an address from geographic 
coordinates through a process known 
as “reverse geocoding.”
Crime data is one of the most heavily 
sought municipal datasets and, in 
the case of sexual assault-related 
incidents, one of the most sensitive. 
In order to protect the identities of 
victims when sharing open data, many 
jurisdictions remove the names and 
addresses associated with sexual 
assault incidents. However, such data 
occasionally includes the geographic 
coordinates of these incidents. Be-
cause it is relatively simple to obtain an 
address from geographic coordinates, 
this makes the victims of sexual assault 
highly identifiable. There are significant 
consequences if sexual assault victims 
are re-identified, including undue 
public scrutiny, violation of state shield 
laws, and potential chilling effects for 
future reports of sexual assault and 
domestic violence.
Unstructured 
fields
Fields that contain com-
ments, descriptions, or 
other forms of unstruc-
tured text (as opposed 
to structured fields, in 
which entries must take 
one of several predeter-
mined values). Photos 
can also be considered 
unstructured fields, 
as there are often few 
bounds on what informa-
tion they may contain.
Freeform text fields are often used in 
unpredictable ways, meaning that their 
publication may expose unexpected 
sensitive information.
In 2012, Philadelphia’s Department 
of Licenses & Inspections published 
gun permit appeals as part of its open 
data initiative. These permits included 
freeform text fields in which appli-
cants explained why they needed the 
permit, and where some people wrote 
that they carry large sums of cash at 
night. As a consequence for pub-
lishing this information, the City was 
ultimately charged $1.4 million as part 
of a class-action lawsuit. One of the 
lawyers behind the suit stated that the 
information released “was a road map 
for criminals.”
Sensitive  
subsets
Datasets can provide in-
formation about diverse 
populations or events. 
Each unique type of per-
son or event represents a 
subset of the data.
Certain categories of people (such 
as minors and sexual assault victims) 
within a dataset may be systematically 
more sensitive than the rest. Informa-
tion that might be suitable for release 
with the majority of data might be 
highly sensitive when it connects to 
these sensitive subsets.
In 2016, The Washington Post released 
a report describing how “the names 
of six people who complained of sex-
ual assault were published online by 
Dallas police.” While the Dallas Police 
Department did not release “reports 
categorized as sexual assaults,” some 
cases involving complaints of sexual 
assault were classified into categories 
such as “Class C Assault offenses” 
and “Injured Person.” While it may be 
appropriate to release names in most 
cases in these general categories, the 
subsets related to sexual assault re-
quire special protections beyond what 
is needed for the majority of the data.
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METHOD DESCRIPTION EXAMPLE PRIVACY IMPACT UTILITY IMPACT
Removing fields Deleting fields that 
contain sensitive 
information.
Removing the ad-
dresses from every 
record in a dataset of 
police incidents.
Removing fields 
effectively removes 
the risks presented by 
those fields
This approach nullifies 
any utility made 
possible by the fields 
being removed. So 
the negative impact 
on utility is large when 
removing fields that 
enable valuable uses, 
but small for less 
valuable fields.
Removing records Deleting records 
that are particular-
ly sensitive, either 
because of the type of 
event represented or 
because of rare (and 
hence more easily 
identifiable) features.
Removing records of 
sexual assault from 
a dataset of police 
incidents.
This is an effective 
way to protect the 
privacy of those 
represented in the 
removed records.
Because only a subset 
of records have been 
removed and the rest 
remain intact, the 
data remains viable 
for analysis. However, 
the removal of records 
could skew the results 
or give a false impres-
sion about the under-
lying data. And any 
analyses that rely on 
the removed records 
will be negatively 
impacted.
Aggregating data Summarizing data 
across the population 
and releasing a report 
of those statistics.
Reporting the num-
ber of crimes that 
occurred each month 
rather than releasing 
data about individual 
incidents.
Releasing aggregat-
ed data effectively 
protects privacy, as no 
raw data entries are 
released.
This has a severe neg-
ative impact on utility, 
as there is no raw data 
allowing for insights 
beyond the statistics 
presented.
OPEN DATA  
PRIVACY MITIGATIONS
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METHOD DESCRIPTION EXAMPLE PRIVACY IMPACT UTILITY IMPACT
Generalizing data Reducing the preci-
sion of fields in order 
to make each entry 
less unique.
Reporting addresses 
by hundred-block 
increments, block 
groups, or census 
tracts.
The less that data is 
generalized, the eas-
ier it is to re-identify 
someone. Lower lev-
els of generalization 
(e.g., block group) 
provide more oppor-
tunities for re-identi-
fication than higher 
levels (e.g., zip code). 
However, while gener-
alizing data can make 
re-identification more 
difficult, research has 
shown that coarsening 
data has only limited 
impact.
The more that data 
is generalized and is 
characterized at less 
granular levels, the 
less useful it be-
comes. Lower levels 
of generalization (e.g., 
block group) provide 
more useful informa-
tion than higher levels 
(e.g., zip code).
k-anonymity Generalizing fields 
such that at least k in-
dividuals exhibit each 
feature within those 
fields. Different traits 
will require a different 
level of generaliza-
tion, depending on 
how many other en-
tries exhibit that trait.
For k=5, for example, 
generalizing dates of 
crime incidents such 
that every date shown 
contains at least five 
events that occurred. 
If 5 events occurred in 
a given hour, then the 
time of those events 
would be present-
ed as the hour they 
occurred; if 5 events 
occurred in a given 
day, those events 
would be attributed 
to the day with no 
information about the 
time of day.
As with generaliza-
tion, the improvement 
in privacy protection 
increases as the level 
of generalization (in 
this case, the value of 
k) increases. How-
ever, the efficacy of 
k-anonymity is limited 
in high-dimensional 
datasets (those that 
contain many fields) 
and in data that con-
tains outliers or rare 
cases.
As with generaliza-
tion, the negative 
impact on utility 
increases as the level 
of generalization (in 
this case, the value of 
k) increases
Adding noise  
(a.k.a. random  
perturbation)
Adjusting data with 
randomness to offset 
its original informa-
tion.
Offsetting geographic 
coordinates of crime 
locations by a random 
distance and direction 
(generated from prob-
ability distributions).
The level of privacy 
protection increases 
as more noise is add-
ed to a dataset. The 
impact of noise de-
pends on the density 
of the population in 
question: less dense 
populations require 
more noise to protect 
privacy
As more noise is 
added to a dataset, 
the less useful it be-
comes, since the data 
presented becomes 
further removed from 
the events they rep-
resent. Furthermore, 
noisy data can be 
hard to communicate 
to the public and may 
be seen as misleading 
or an obfuscation of 
the truth. We recom-
mend against adding 
noise, and instead 
suggest generalizing 
data.
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METHOD DESCRIPTION EXAMPLE PRIVACY IMPACT UTILITY IMPACT
Creating 
anonymous 
identifiers
Replacing attributes 
with randomly generat-
ed codes that have no 
underlying connection 
to the attribute they 
replace. This is done 
through a correspon-
dence table, in which 
each unique attribute 
is paired with a ran-
dom identifier that will 
replace that attribute 
wherever it appears.
In a dataset of taxi trips, 
replacing each unique 
license plate with its 
own unique ID number 
(e.g., a random number 
drawn from between 1 
and the total number 
of license plates). Every 
entry containing a given 
license plate would have 
the same ID number.
Anonymous IDs can 
help protect privacy, 
assuming that the anon-
ymous IDs are randomly 
generated and have no 
systematic connection 
to the attributes they 
replace (which would 
occur for example if the 
numbers were assigned 
based on the alphanu-
merical order of license 
plates or a direct hash 
of license plates). Note 
that creating anonymous 
IDs does not protect 
against re-identifications 
or inferences based on 
analyzing patterns of 
behavior. Furthermore, 
having any common 
identifier across all en-
tries related to a specific 
individual means that 
once one entry has been 
re-identified, all entries 
for that person have also 
been re-identified.
This approach should 
have minimal impacts on 
utility, since it is still pos-
sible to track attributes 
across records.
Differential 
privacy
Differential privacy is 
a formal mathematical 
definition of privacy that 
provides a provable 
guarantee of privacy 
against a wide range 
of potential attacks. It 
is not a single tool, but 
rather a standard of 
privacy that many tools 
have been devised to 
satisfy. Some differential-
ly private tools utilize an 
interactive query-based 
mechanism, and others 
are non-interactive (i.e., 
enabling data to be 
released and used). 
Theoretical research on 
differential privacy is rap-
idly advancing, and the 
number of practical tools 
providing differential pri-
vacy is continually grow-
ing. For these reasons, 
differentially private 
tools are becoming an 
increasingly promising 
solution for cities to 
use in combination with 
other legal and techno-
logical tools for sharing 
data while protecting 
individual privacy.
Government agencies 
and corporations cur-
rently use differentially 
private tools to provide 
strong privacy protection 
when sharing statistics. 
The Census Bureau, 
for example, currently 
makes some of its data 
available using non-in-
teractive differentially 
privacy. Additional tools 
for differentially private 
analysis are under 
development at research 
institutions.
Differential privacy pro-
vides strong guarantees 
regarding the exact level 
of privacy risk available 
through a dataset. In 
contrast to traditional 
de-identification tech-
niques that are often 
designed to address a 
narrow class of attacks, 
systems that adhere to 
strong formal standards 
like differential privacy 
provide protection that 
is robust to a wide range 
of potential attacks — 
including attacks that are 
unknown at the time of 
deployment — and do 
not require the person 
applying the technique 
to anticipate particular 
modes of attack.
Differential privacy min-
imally alters the under-
lying data, ensuring that 
the data retains almost 
all of its utility even after 
transformation. This 
feature distinguishes dif-
ferentially private tools 
from traditional de-iden-
tification techniques, 
which often require 
more blunt alterations. 
In addition to their 
robust privacy guaran-
tee, differentially private 
tools have the benefit of 
transparency, as it is not 
necessary to maintain 
secrecy around a differ-
entially private compu-
tation or its parameters. 
Nonetheless, as with 
the approach above 
of adding noise, users 
of differentially private 
results may struggle 
to interpret the data.  
Furthermore, providing 
data transformed in this 
way limits the ability to 
review specific records 
and might be seen as 
antithetical to open 
data.
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DATA FEATURES (ASSETS 
AND VULNERABILITIES)
What are the rows, columns, 
entries, or sets of entries that 
may contribute to benefit  
or risk?
ADVANTAGE EVENTS
In what forms is the data  
feature beneficial? How will  
it be used?
ADVANTAGE SOURCES
Who might use the  
data feature? 
BENEFIT
What is the overall benefit  
of the data feature?
 Individual records
 Aggregated data
Potential uses:
 Civic hackers 
 Community groups
 Individuals
 Journalists
 Researchers
 Other
 Individual records
 Aggregate data
Potential uses:
 Civic hackers 
 Community groups
 Individuals
 Journalists
 Researchers
 Other
 Individual records
 Aggregate data
Potential uses:
 Civic hackers 
 Community groups
 Individuals
 Journalists
 Researchers
 Other
 Individual records
 Aggregate data
Potential uses:
 Civic hackers 
 Community groups
 Individuals
 Journalists
 Researchers
 Other
IMPACT
What is the 
potential benefit 
of the asset 
(balancing scale 
and utility)?
LIKELIHOOD
What is the probability 
that the impact will be realized?
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IMPACT
What is the 
potential benefit 
of the asset 
(balancing scale 
and utility)?
LIKELIHOOD
What is the probability 
that the impact will be realized?
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THREAT EVENTS
In what ways is the data feature 
risky? How might it be abused?
THREAT SOURCES
Who might abuse the data 
feature?
RISK
What is the overall risk of the 
feature?
RISK-BENEFIT RATIO
What is the overall risk-benefit ratio as 
determined by the benefit assessment 
and the risk assessment?
 Individual records
 Aggregated data
Potential uses:
 Civic hackers 
 Community groups
 Individuals
 Journalists
 Researchers
 Other
 Individual records
 Aggregate data
Potential uses:
 Civic hackers 
 Community groups
 Individuals
 Journalists
 Researchers
 Other
 Individual records
 Aggregate data
Potential uses:
 Civic hackers 
 Community groups
 Individuals
 Journalists
 Researchers
 Other
 Individual records
 Aggregate data
Potential uses:
 Civic hackers 
 Community groups
 Individuals
 Journalists
 Researchers
 Other
IMPACT
What is the 
potential risk of 
the vulnerability 
(balancing scale 
and severity)?
LIKELIHOOD
What is the probability 
that the impact will be realized?
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and severity)?
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RISK-BENEFIT ANALYSIS FORM
Green, Ben, Gabe Cunningham, Ariel Ekblaw, Paul Kominers, Andrew Linzer, and Susan Crawford. Open Data Privacy (2017). Berkman Klein Center 
Research Publication. Available at DASH: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:30340010.
DATA FEATURES (ASSETS AND 
VULNERABILITIES)
What are the rows, columns, entries, 
or sets of entries that may contribute 
to benefit or risk?
MITIGATIONS
What are the potential controls  
to mitigate risk?
RISK-BENEFIT RATIO  
AFTER MITIGATION
What is the outcome of the  
risk-benefit analysis after mitigation? 
FINAL OUTCOME
What is the final decision for  
how to release the data?
 Remove fields 
 Remove records
 Aggregate data
 Generalize data
 Anonymize IDs
 Other
Mitigation chosen:
 Remove fields 
 Remove records
 Aggregate data
 Generalize data
 Anonymize IDs
 Other
Mitigation chosen:
 Remove fields 
 Remove records
 Aggregate data
 Generalize data
 Anonymize IDs
 Other
Mitigation chosen:
 Remove fields 
 Remove records
 Aggregate data
 Generalize data
 Anonymize IDs
 Other
Mitigation chosen:
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ATTRIBUTE RISK DESCRIPTION EXAMPLE(S) MITIGATING ACTION(S)
Category 1:  
Individual  
identifiers
Does the data contain 
information and  
attributes directly tied 
to an individual?
Many types of infor-
mation can be used 
to identify individuals 
within a dataset. Even 
if a field does not by 
itself identify an indi-
vidual, it can be used 
in conjunction with 
other fields to do so.
•  Name
•  Sex
•  Race
•  Address
•  Birthdate
•  Phone number
•  User ID
•  License plate
Reduce the precision of 
these fields or remove them 
entirely.
Does the data contain 
repeated records 
of an individual’s 
actions?
Behavioral records, of-
ten known as metada-
ta, describe detailed 
and unique patterns 
of behavior that make 
it easy to identify 
individuals and learn 
intimate details about 
that person.
•   User IDs in records 
of bikeshare usage
•   License plates in 
records of taxi trips
Remove the fields that 
provide references to 
individuals, so that records 
cannot be connected based 
on the person. Or provide 
anonymous identifiers in 
place of these individual 
IDs, ensuring that they 
are randomly generated 
and there is no systematic 
connection between the 
original and anonymized IDs 
(such as alphabetical order).
Category 2:  
References  
to location
Does the dataset 
contain references to 
locations?
Location data is often 
highly identifiable and 
can reveal particularly 
sensitive details about 
individuals.
•   Addresses of inci-
dents in 911 reports
•   Pickup and dropoff 
location of taxi trips
Remove these fields or 
reduce the precision (i.e., 
generalize street address 
into zip code).
Does the dataset 
contain geographic 
coordinates?
Although not hu-
man-interpretable, 
geographic coordi-
nates can be easily 
mapped to a street 
address.
Geographic coordi-
nates for the location 
of 311 requests
Does the dataset contain 
references to locations?
OPEN DATA  
RELEASE CHECKLIST
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ATTRIBUTE RISK DESCRIPTION EXAMPLE(S) MITIGATING ACTION(S)
Category 3:  
Sensitive fields  
and subsets
Does the data contain 
any unstructured text 
fields?
Unstructured text 
fields are often used 
in unpredictable 
ways, meaning that 
their publication may 
expose unexpected 
sensitive information.
Permit applications 
that include the ap-
plicant’s explanation 
of why the permit is 
required.
Remove the unstructured 
fields entirely or evaluate 
the entries to check for 
sensitive information.
Does the data contain 
any types of records 
that are particularly 
sensitive?
Certain categories of 
records within a data-
set may be systemat-
ically more sensitive 
than the rest.
Sexual assault inci-
dents within a dataset 
of crime incident 
reports.
Treat these records with 
particular care, either by re-
moving the entries entirely 
or removing/generalizing 
sensitive fields from these 
entries.
Does the data contain 
information that also 
appears in other 
datasets?
Connecting informa-
tion across multiple 
datasets may reveal 
sensitive information 
that is not contained 
within any individual 
dataset. This is known 
as the mosaic effect.
Demographic infor-
mation (e.g., age, 
race, and gender) that 
appears in multiple 
datasets.
Remove or reduce the pre-
cision of any fields that are 
present in other public data.
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LOW: The public has not ex-
pressed any interest in this data or 
related data.
MEDIUM: The public has ex-
pressed mild interest in this data or 
related data.
HIGH: The public has  
expressed high interest in this data 
or related data.
LOW: There are no clear benefits 
to releasing this data
Low benefit
MEDIUM: There are mild benefits 
to releasing this data  
Medium benefit
HIGH: There are significant bene-
fits to releasing this data.
High benefit
1. Determine benefits
Ta
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Public support for releasing data (public records requests, etc.)
LOW: The data reveals information 
that is typically made public.
MEDIUM: The data might reveal 
mildly sensitive information that 
some members of the public would 
not expect to be made available.
HIGH: The data reveals sensitive 
information that the public would 
not expect to be made available.
LOW: Re-identification is not likely, 
nor would it generate any harm for 
those affected.
Low risk
MEDIUM: Re-identification is some-
what likely to occur, and could generate 
moderate harm for those affected.
Medium risk
HIGH: Re-identification is likely to 
occur, and could generate signifi-
cant harm for those affected.
High risk
2. Determine risks Social norms violations of releasing data (i.e., public expectation of privacy)
R
e-
id
en
tifi
ca
tio
n 
ris
ks
 a
nd
 
ha
rm
s 
o
f r
el
ea
si
ng
 d
at
a 
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS  
MANAGEMENT FORM
LOW MEDIUM HIGH
LOW Release data
MEDIUM Possibly release data; weigh 
the case-specific risks and 
benefits
HIGH Do not release data
3. Balance benefits and risks Benefit
R
is
k
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